I have been invited to attend another workshop on Anti-Corruption Measures in Marrakesh, Morocco, in October 2011. It is an opportunity that I have embraced although the time taken to actually arrive in this country is long and exhausting. But, the debate on introducing courses and legislation on anti-corruption in universities, business and law schools and indeed in the public arena is critical today. I represent, or so it seems to me (or perhaps my ego), the lone voice of a member of the academic community from a developing country. (Please note this trip has not been sponsored by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, the Integrity Commission or the UWI).
Some suggest that the term corruption and the word "sleaze" can be used interchangeably. But according to Joseph Nye (1967), there is a distinction between the two terms. Nye (1967), for instance, defines corruption as "behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of public role because of the private-regarding, pecuniary or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types or private-regarding influence." On the other hand, other writers (Dunleavy and Weir, 2002) observe that sleaze was an "odd concept" that sprang into prominence in the mid-1990s. It differs from the narrower conception of corruption since it marries disparate areas of "near" wrong-doing across several parts of public life which had previously been considered entirely separate.
Indeed, the definition of sleaze now includes a number of areas such as alleged financial wrongdoings by ministers, lobbying, patronage, unconventional behaviour by ministers and large unjustified increases in the incomes and share options of directors in State companies and utilities. The term sleaze, therefore, appears to encompass a number of dimensions which were previously considered to be individual elements and is therefore wider in its scope. During the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, what writers defined as corruption and which may now be better described as sleaze, was believed to be a problem that was confined to developing countries. Policy makers as well as members of the academic community are now wiser and recognise that corruption is a problem in both the developing as well as the developed countries alike.
In the 1990s, the concept of corruption was further expanded to include the term "grand corruption," which it was alleged occurred at the highest level of government and involves major government projects and proposals (Moody-Stewart, 1997). A number of writers have explored the various avenues which allow for corruption and by extension sleaze. One major avenue is via procurement contracts. It has been observed that corrupt payments to win major contracts and concessions are generally the preserve of large businesses and high-level officials. According to the literature on corruption, if the government is a buyer or a contractor, there are several reasons to pay off officials.
• First, a firm may pay to be included in the list of pre-qualified bidders and to restrict the length of the list.
• Second, it may pay for inside information.
• Thirdly, bribes may induce officials to structure the bidding specifications so that the corrupt firm is the only qualified supplier.
• Fourthly, a firm may pay to be selected as the winning contractor.
Because, it is argued, that scarcity lies at the heart of corrupt deals, it is suggested that some reforms may indeed lead to the reduction of corruption. The following reform options have accordingly been proposed:
(a) Programme elimination
Most writers agree that the most straightforward way to limit corruption is to eliminate corruption-laden programmes. The reasoning is that if the State has no authority to restrict exports or licence businesses this eliminates the source of bribes.
Examples used are:
(i) If a subsidy programme is eliminated, the bribes that accompany them will disappear;
(ii) If price controls are lifted, market prices will express scarcity values.
The argument for the elimination of programmes are telling. For instance, some public programme (and we have seen this in the past with DEWD and its various incantations) work so poorly that they function principally as bribe-generating machines for officials.
(b) Privatisation
It should be noted that privatisation can be viewed as both an anti-corruption reform and a new potential source of corrupt gain. Although privatisation is the only viable option in a wide range of cases, reformers suggest that the following measures should be applied in order to reduce corruption. For instance, the process should ensure the widest level of participation rather than favouring consortia with strong ties to local elites. The process should also be transparent and well publicised. Finally new regulatory institutions must be created that are not themselves subject to improper influence.
(c) Reform of public programmes
Many regulatory and spending programmes have strong jurisdictions and ought to be reformed, not eliminated. It is suggested that corruption in the collection of taxes cannot be solved by failing to collect revenue. The solution offered is to clarify and streamline the necessary laws to reduce official discretion and to make monitoring simpler and less arbitrary.
(d) The deterrent effect of anti-corruption laws
It has been argued that the deterrence of criminal behaviour depends on the probability of detection and punishment and on the penalties imposed-both those imposed by the legal system and more subtle costs such as loss of reputation or shame. Often, though, the law cannot 'prove' beyond reasonable doubt that a corrupt act has been committed. In other words, successful detection depends on the 'insiders' or the whistle blowers who unfortunately are not protected by the law. Effective deterrence is impossible unless the police can obtain evidence-a difficult task because often the participants are the only people who know of the corrupt deal and they could be extremely creative. In addition, a major problem in many countries resides in the process of establishing a rule of law to clarify what practices can be categorised as illegal and subject to criminal penalties.
(e) Procurement reform
Corruption scandals frequently involve government procurement of goods and services. Bribes can not only determine who obtains a contract but also the size and specifications of the government purchases. Thus procurement reforms highlights the trade offs between avoiding corruption and giving officials the flexibility to make decisions in the light of their own knowledge. A number of procurement reforms have accordingly been introduced in the US which places emphasis on specifications, categorisations of services, pre-bid communications and transparency. (Much of this literature is available on the book by Susan Rose Ackerman-Corruption and Government).
It is evident, then, that corruption and now sleaze will continue to be terms that will continue to be heard in relation to subsidies, allocation of resources, biddings, procurement, contracts and even placement to high offices. It is clear that corruption will never end as long as human beings exist. What is important to note is that it can be minimised...if...the media is vigilant, the middle classes are watchful, if the whistle blower continues to speak and if the public is educated and informed. The role of the media and the civil society is thus critical in the fight against corruption.