The geopo­lit­i­cal land­scape has grown in­creas­ing­ly com­plex.

The war in Ukraine con­tin­ues un­abat­ed, plac­ing the world’s ma­jor pow­ers in in­di­rect con­fronta­tion, while sev­er­al small­er con­flicts in the Mid­dle East and else­where re­main po­ten­tial­ly desta­bil­is­ing.

Clos­er to home, the Unit­ed States has de­clared an an­ti–drug traf­fick­ing op­er­a­tion in the Caribbean Sea and has in­ten­si­fied pres­sure on the Maduro-led gov­ern­ment in Venezuela by seiz­ing un­sanc­tioned oil tankers and con­fis­cat­ing oil ship­ments pur­chased by an­oth­er su­per­pow­er, Chi­na. Rus­sia, Chi­na, and Venezuela have con­demned these ac­tions as pira­cy, in­creas­ing the risk that the stand­off be­tween the Unit­ed States and Venezuela could es­ca­late with wider re­gion­al reper­cus­sions.

Against this back­drop, fun­da­men­tal ques­tions arise.

What is the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion’s endgame in Venezuela? Is the coun­try at risk of di­rect mil­i­tary ac­tion, whether through air strikes or a ground in­va­sion? Why does US pol­i­cy ap­pear im­pro­vised, and how might these de­vel­op­ments af­fect Trinidad and To­ba­go?

Cru­cial­ly, what risk as­sess­ments have been con­duct­ed?

These ques­tions must be ad­e­quate­ly ad­dressed for the Trinidad and To­ba­go pub­lic.

Re­gion­al group­ings such as Cari­com re­main es­sen­tial for eco­nom­ic in­te­gra­tion and the co­or­di­na­tion of for­eign pol­i­cy among Caribbean states.

While Cari­com has ex­pe­ri­enced pe­ri­ods of strain, dis­agree­ment, and un­der­per­for­mance, the Gov­ern­ment has, at this point, sig­nalled that it views the group­ing as an un­re­li­able part­ner.

Not all stake­hold­ers share this view. Both the Joint Con­sul­ta­tive Coun­cil and the Cham­ber of In­dus­try and Com­merce have reaf­firmed the im­por­tance of Cari­com to na­tion­al and re­gion­al in­ter­ests.

As a lead­ing mem­ber and a key ben­e­fi­cia­ry of Cari­com, Trinidad and To­ba­go has a re­spon­si­bil­i­ty to help ad­dress any dys­func­tions to which it may have con­tributed.

Dis­tanc­ing our­selves from the re­gion­al bloc may not serve our long-term in­ter­ests. It is there­fore re­as­sur­ing that Prime Min­is­ter Kam­la Per­sad-Bisses­sar has in­di­cat­ed there is no im­me­di­ate in­ten­tion to with­draw Trinidad and To­ba­go from Cari­com.

There are al­so those who ar­gue that the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion may, at this time, be a less re­li­able part­ner than Cari­com, point­ing to its up­end­ing of in­ter­na­tion­al trade agree­ments, the im­po­si­tion of tar­iffs, and the trade wars that fol­lowed, in­volv­ing coun­tries far larg­er than Trinidad and To­ba­go.

While our Gov­ern­ment has no con­trol over US ac­tions, clos­er align­ment with Wash­ing­ton has placed us at odds with oth­er Cari­com states that view an ex­pand­ed US pres­ence in the re­gion as dis­rup­tive to re­gion­al peace.

There is no easy path through these com­plex chal­lenges of in­ter­na­tion­al re­la­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly amid dif­fi­cult eco­nom­ic con­di­tions.

Ul­ti­mate­ly, the Gov­ern­ment, armed with a clear par­lia­men­tary ma­jor­i­ty, is ful­ly en­ti­tled to pur­sue its for­eign pol­i­cy un­der the man­date grant­ed by the elec­torate, in­clud­ing deep­en­ing ties with the Unit­ed States in pur­suit of na­tion­al se­cu­ri­ty and eco­nom­ic sta­bil­i­ty.

At the same time, it must en­sure that such align­ment pro­duces tan­gi­ble, mea­sur­able ben­e­fits for the peo­ple of Trinidad and To­ba­go - whether through en­hanced se­cu­ri­ty co­op­er­a­tion, en­er­gy sta­bil­i­ty, trade ac­cess, or eco­nom­ic op­por­tu­ni­ty - while pre­serv­ing our long-stand­ing com­mit­ment to re­gion­al sol­i­dar­i­ty and in­de­pen­dent judge­ment.