Po­lit­i­cal lead­ers are elect­ed to solve prob­lems and make changes that would ben­e­fit all cit­i­zens. Hold­ing of­fice is a grind­ing process that is not for the faint-heart­ed or the thin-skinned. In fact, sound pol­i­cy­mak­ing is low on im­me­di­ate re­wards and re­quires tough choic­es that rarely please every­one. Not all prob­lems can be solved po­lit­i­cal­ly. There­fore, lead­ers must iden­ti­fy the sig­nif­i­cant chal­lenges and com­mu­ni­cate the po­lices, if not the so­lu­tions, to ad­dress na­tion­al chal­lenges.

Main­tain­ing the pub­lic’s trust and con­fi­dence is the bedrock of po­lit­i­cal le­git­i­ma­cy and ap­proval. Pub­lic trust and con­fi­dence are foun­da­tion­al prin­ci­ples, not op­tion­al ex­tras. Cit­i­zen en­gage­ment is crit­i­cal to democ­ra­cy as gov­ern­ments rule by con­sent, not co­er­cion. With­out trust, even legal­ly valid de­ci­sions are seen as il­le­git­i­mate, pro­vok­ing re­sis­tance or dis­en­gage­ment. These prin­ci­ples are es­sen­tial giv­en the chal­leng­ing eco­nom­ic sce­nario that lies be­fore us.

Ul­ti­mate­ly, eco­nom­ic per­for­mance is the lit­mus test of po­lit­i­cal per­for­mance. Small states must al­so be ju­di­cious in their for­eign pol­i­cy po­si­tions, as they are not large enough to al­ter the course of in­ter­na­tion­al events. This coun­try’s ge­og­ra­phy has placed it in an un­en­vi­able po­si­tion of be­ing sucked in­to wide-reach­ing geopo­lit­i­cal ten­sions, adding an­oth­er lay­er of com­plex­i­ty to its al­ready dif­fi­cult eco­nom­ic po­si­tion.

Trinidad and To­ba­go is a mem­ber of the Unit­ed Na­tions and of Cari­com and is a sig­na­to­ry to many in­ter­na­tion­al treaties and agree­ments. Venezuela is our clos­est neigh­bour, and the Unit­ed States is our largest and most pow­er­ful trad­ing part­ner. The tankers seized last week were car­ry­ing crude oil bought and paid for by Chi­na, with whom we have fi­nan­cial and eco­nom­ic ties. Chi­na is now a peer com­peti­tor to the Unit­ed States and Latin Amer­i­ca’s sec­ond largest trad­ing part­ner. The Unit­ed States’ most re­cent for­eign pol­i­cy state­ment has reem­pha­sised its in­tent to main­tain the Mon­roe Doc­trine, there­by as­sert­ing con­trol over Latin Amer­i­ca and the Caribbean as its sphere of in­flu­ence. The seizure and ex­trac­tion of Venezuela’s Pres­i­dent Nico­las Maduro, its po­lit­i­cal leader, is il­le­gal, re­gion­al­ly and glob­al­ly desta­bil­is­ing, up­ends in­ter­na­tion­al norms, ig­nores sov­er­eign ter­ri­to­r­i­al rights, and po­ten­tial­ly cre­ates an an­ar­chic sit­u­a­tion in­side Venezuela it­self. This ac­tion val­i­dates Putin’s grab of Ukraine and le­git­imis­es Chi­na’s ag­gres­sion against Tai­wan.

Prime Min­is­ter Kam­la Bisses­sar Per­sad con­firmed that Trinidad and To­ba­go was not in­volved in the Unit­ed States’ de­ci­sion to seize Pres­i­dent Maduro. Whilst not a reaf­fir­ma­tion of the prin­ci­ple of self-de­ter­mi­na­tion, it sug­gest­ed that Trinidad and To­ba­go was neu­tral and did not overt­ly sup­port the US ac­tion. These are ear­ly days, and one does not know how the sit­u­a­tion will even­tu­al­ly be de­ter­mined. It con­firms that US ac­tions were al­ways geared to regime change un­der the guise of an an­ti-nar­cotics op­er­a­tion.

Trinidad and To­ba­go needs Venezuela and a sta­ble part­ner with which it can do busi­ness un­fet­tered by US sanc­tions or OFAC’s li­cences. These are ear­ly days yet. There has been no trans­fer of pow­er in Venezuela, and the sit­u­a­tion is still flu­id. While Pres­i­dent Trump has in­di­cat­ed that the US is in charge, the re­al­i­ty is that this re­mains to be de­ter­mined. What­ev­er hap­pens, Trinidad and To­ba­go must en­sure that it does what is re­quired to put its in­ter­ests first.