In piloting the Constitution (Republic) Bill 1976 in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Eric Williams said, “In the absence or inability of the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate will act. In the event that the President of the Senate might himself be unavailable, the Speaker of the House of Representatives will take over.” (Hansard, House of Representatives, March 12, 1976, p 679).
This was the Williams innovation to use the presiding officers of Parliament for the acting arrangements for the new presidency. These arrangements permitted the majority party to secure presiding officers of their choice to serve as acting president.
His projection was that the PNM would remain the dominant party because all other parties would continue in opposition because of vote splitting under the first-past-the-post system. After his death, the PNM entered opposition in 1986, 1995, 2010, and 2025.
Williams described the presidential powers under the new power of consultation as follows: “In respect of Chapter 5, Executive Powers, we have made provision for discretion to be exercised in respect of consultation by the President of the Republic; that obviously will be out of place when the Head of State was a Governor-General as the representative of a foreign sovereign. We made provision, taking into account the further recommendation of the Joint Select Committee, for the unfortunate eventuality where there might be no Leader of the Opposition, or, as the Joint Select Committee recommended, where the Leader of the Opposition refuses for one reason or another to act.” (Hansard, House of Representatives, March 12, 1976, p 681).
The emasculation of the office of Leader of the Opposition for the new powers of consultation for the presidency and, by extension, the acting president, was implemented at section 83(6):
“Where the office of Leader of the Opposition is vacant, whether because there is no member of the House of Representatives so qualified for appointment or because no one qualified for appointment is willing to be appointed, or because the Leader of the Opposition has resigned his office or for any other reason, any provision in this Constitution requiring consultation with the Leader of the Opposition shall, insofar as it requires such consultation, be of no effect.”
The Williams model on consultation involving the Leader of the Opposition included an umbrella clause—“or for any other reason”—to completely render the Leader of the Opposition useless in consultation matters. The republican Constitution expected the PNM would remain a dominant party, winning election after election. The opposition parties were expected to remain divided and be permanently in opposition. The script has not worked that way.
The recent appointment of the Chief Justice has not violated any aspect of our Constitution.
The Leader of the Opposition complained about the time allocated to her for consultation over the Chief Justice. Her complaints fall into the emasculation of her office as designed by Williams. The critics have conveniently avoided this.
When Ivor Archie was appointed Chief Justice by President George Maxwell Richards in 2008, one day after the tortured departure of Satnarine Sharma as Chief Justice, there was no hue and cry over swift consultation.
The real problem with the appointment of the new Chief Justice was that President Christine Kangaloo did not make the appointment herself. The outgoing Chief Justice suddenly changed his timetable for retirement once Kangaloo left the country.
This placed the matter in the hands of the Acting President, and he consulted before making a substantive appointment.
It is not surprising that all of these vocal critics have conveniently forgotten that former president Ellis Clarke controversially left the country for three days in 1986 and made no arrangements for an acting president so as to avert any substantive appointments being made by President of the Senate Dr Wahid Ali.
According to the Sunday Guardian for April 13, 1986, President Clarke said, upon his return: “If I had been leaving the country on a Sunday to return the following Sunday, I would have no doubt in my mind that the President of the Senate would act. But whether he should act when I am away for one or two days, that is for me to determine.” (See “President Clears the Air”, Sunday Guardian, April 13, 1986, pp1 and 18).
Perhaps the critics would have no problem with that avoidance strategy to prevent an Acting President from making presidential appointments.
Normally, the Cabinet and the Chief Justice would be informed about any presidential absence so that acting arrangements can be made because the security of the State is at risk.
Also, travel funding may have to be approved. Short memories create fake present-day crises that should never exist.
Prof Hamid Ghany is Professor of Constitutional Affairs and Parliamentary Studies at The University of the West Indies (UWI). He was also appointed an Honorary Professor of The UWI upon his retirement in October 2021. He continues his research and publications and also does some teaching at The UWI.
