Clico, the failed insurance company, has 225,000 traditional long-term policyholders, those holding its pension plans, life insurance and health insurance policies. Those policyholders account for $6 billion in liabilities. In the 2011 budget speech, in referring to Clico, Finance Minister Winston Dookeran said: "We will separate the insurance business from the short-term investment and mutual fund business to protect the insurance policyholders; and the obligations of 225,000 policyholders will be honoured, backed by the statutory fund."
In his contribution to the budget debate on September 23, 2010, Government Senator, Patrick Watson, speaking about the 225,000 policyholders who bought into the classic insurance operations of Clico, said: "And in one fell swoop, in the statement from the Minister of Finance, the 90 per cent of the investors/depositors-I want to use that word very guardedly, those who put their trust in Clico-the reassurance was given in gold that they have absolutely nothing to worry about." Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in her statement to Parliament on October 1, 2010, said: "All of the traditional, long-term insurance policyholders; group pensions and long-term annuities and so on, would be fully protected."
From their utterances, these three members of the current administration have sought to assure the 225,000 holders of traditional Clico policies that they will be fully protected, that their long-term annuities, group pensions, life insurance policies or health insurance policies will be honoured when the time comes. Are the assurances given by these three high-ranking members of the Government worth "gold," as Senator Watson would have the country believe? The first point that arises is that if Clico, which is controlled directly by the Central Bank, has refused to honour the monthly or quarterly interest payments on EFPA policies-following a directive from the Minister of Finance-why should the company be trusted to honour any contract?
If Clico-directed by Mr Dookeran-has refused to honour EFPA policies that have matured, why should the company be trusted to honour the "guarantee" provided to the long-term policyholders by Mr Dookeran, Prof Watson or Mrs Persad-Bissessar? The second point is that if the current administration can disregard the many assurances on the Clico issue given by the previous Minister of Finance, Karen Tesheira, and the current Central Bank Governor, Ewart Williams, what is to prevent them disregarding the assurance that they themselves have given? As Opposition Senator, Pennelope Beckles-Robinson, put it in the September 23, 2010 debate: "If you give a guarantee that talks about 20 years now, if the PNM guarantee and the Central Bank guarantee were not good, why is the guarantee being offered now by this Minister of Finance good? It can change at any time."
Responding to Mrs Beckles-Robinson in wrapping up the debate, the Minister of Finance said that the guarantee provided by the previous administration "belies the point that there is a distinction between the willingness to offer a guarantee and an ability to do so. There is no doubt that by the action of the previous government, in spite of their words, they did not have in their deeds the ability to do so." Mr Dookeran went on to chastise the previous administration for bailing out the CL Financial group but "for 18 months there was no action with respect to honouring this verbal guarantee." It is important to note that Mr Dookeran, in this speech, makes a distinction between the willingness to offer a guarantee and the ability to make good on the guarantee. Quite so.
Has this Government taken any action of its own with respect to honouring its own verbal guarantee to the 225,000 traditional long-term Clico policyholders? In explaining the difference between the previous administration's verbal guarantee and its own, Mr Dookeran in the September 23 budget debate said: "In our proposal, we are offering paper, certificate, bonds, sovereign bonds. It is sovereign bonds and sovereign bonds are always honoured by any government there is in the world. That is the fundamental difference." Mr Dookeran, of course, ignores the numerous examples of governments, with their backs to the wall, which have renegotiated their sovereign bonds to the disadvantage of the bondholders. But he also seems to be unaware of the internal inconsistency of the statement: The traditional, long-term policyholders will NOT receive sovereign bonds. In fact, it is the holders of the short-term investment products (the Executive Flexible Premium Annuity and the mutual funds) that the minister proposes to pay off with 20 annual, zero-interest, sovereign bonds.
The obligations of the traditional, long-term policyholders, according to the minister's budget speech, will be "honoured, backed by the statutory fund." What Mr Dookeran's legal advisers have been telling him, and what he refuses to tell the nation, is that as it relates to the assets in Clico's statutory fund, the EFPA policyholders rank pari passu with the long-term, traditional policyholders. The proof that all of Clico's Trinidad and Tobago policyholders must be treated equitably and without preference can be found in the T&T Insurance Act. At Section 37, the Insurance Act requires insurance companies carrying on long-term business to establish a statutory fund and stipulates that those insurers "shall place in a trust in Trinidad and Tobago, assets equal to its liability and contingency reserves with respect to Trinidad and Tobago policyholders."
The Insurance Act (1980) makes no distinction between those holding a traditional annuity policy as opposed to those holding an EFPA. All of Clico's Trinidad and Tobago policyholders, whether holding a TT or US dollar policy, are covered by the statutory fund. This means that Clico's Eastern Caribbean policyholders are not covered by the statutory fund. It also means that those who invested in Clico's mutual funds are not covered by the statutory fund. Section 38 (1) makes this crystal clear when it states: "...The assets representing each statutory fund of a company shall not be applied directly or indirectly to any class of business other than that in respect of which the fund was established and is being maintained."
What's more, the Insurance Amendment Act (2009), which was passed by both houses of Parliament in February 2009, amended the Insurance Act specifically to insert the term "annuity contract." This amendment "includes a contract for an annuity at the accumulation stage or the payout stage which is sold or issued to individuals only." The amendment also expanded the term (insurance) "policy" to include annuity contracts. In piloting the Insurance (Amendment) Bill, former Finance Minister Karen Tesheira said there were two forms of annuity contracts that were generally offered by insurance companies: deferred annuities (traditional annuities sold by banks and insurance companies) and immediate annuities, also called single premium annuities, which were sold by Clico.
Ms Tesheira said: "Given the growth of the annuities business in Trinidad and Tobago, it is important that the Insurance Act be made to specifically apply to the regulations of annuities, in much the same way as it does for life insurance business and pension fund plans." In other words, according to the law of Trinidad and Tobago, the assets in Clico's statutory fund are for the sole and exclusive use of its Trinidad and Tobago policyholders, which include both deferred and immediate annuities when sold or issued to individuals only. Any common man reading the Insurance Act and its amendment, therefore, could quickly come to the conclusion that it would be illegal and ultra vires the Insurance Act for the Government to apply the statutory fund assets to long-term, traditional policyholders and not to short-term, non-traditional policyholders.
And the common man would also conclude that it would be illegal to apply the assets in the statutory fund to policyholders in the Eastern Caribbean, who were sold policies by Clico (Trinidad). It would be illegal, as well, for the assets in the statutory fund to be applied to holders of Clico mutual funds and EFPAs sold to institutions such as credit unions, trade unions and educational bodies. This means that Clico's statutory fund assets, which totaled $12.285 billion as at November 2009, MUST be shared equally among the 225,000 long-term policyholders, who held $5.95 billion as at November 2009, and the 25,000 short-term policyholders, who held $10.958 billion. By the November 2009 valuation, therefore, Clico's T&T policyholders would each be entitled to 73 cents on every dollar ($12.285 billion/$16.9 billion).
But if the Clico statutory fund only covers Trinidad and Tobago policyholders who have been issued policies as individuals, the amount that the fund is required to cover is reduced by $3.55 billion: $1.338 billion to non-resident holders of short-term investment products; $1.389 billion owed as a result of the mutual fund guarantee and $830 million for credit unions, trade unions and educational bodies. Those sums will have to be settled by assets outside the statutory fund, which assets are reported to be heavily encumbered. This means that $3.55 billion should be removed from the insurance liabilities covered by the statutory fund, which leaves the fund with a requirement to finance $13.35 billion-a November 2009 deficit of $1.1 billion.
If the Clico statutory fund were applied legally, therefore, it would mean that for every one dollar of insurance liabilities, the fund would cover 92 cents ($12.285 billion/$13.35 billion). Thankfully for both Clico's traditional and EFPA policyholders-those legally entitled to share in the statutory fund in the event of a winding up, liquidation or judicial management-the value of the assets in its statutory fund, especially the Republic Bank and Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) assets, have increased substantially between November 2009 and today. If the statutory fund assets have increased in value in the 26 months, does the Government need to take more taxpayers' money to pay off the Clico's short-term policyholders, which is estimated to cost the Treasury $12 billion over the next 20 years?
