The second Trump administration’s foreign policy approach to counterbalancing China’s growing influence is coming into focus, and has the potential to impact every US diplomatic relationship. US senior officials have increasingly broached the subject of China in their diplomatic engagements with representatives of Caribbean Community (Caricom) member states. This is just one facet of Washington’s China strategy.
In its first 100 days, the Trump administration moved at a steady clip to “deter China’s presence in our region,” commented the US Department of State, referring to the wider Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region.
As I assessed in my recently published article for India’s World magazine, China has gained a foothold in the Caribbean, attaining significant influence through the use of economic statecraft à la the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a Beijing-orchestrated soft power gambit to widen and deepen ties with – among others – the Caribbean.
The BRI provides for significant infrastructure investments and loans, bringing along a sizable Chinese presence in member countries’ respective economic landscapes.
Even though the projects implemented under the Belt and Road framework are regarded as important to enhancing connectivity and economic growth, the risks cannot be discounted. Still, the BRI has emerged as the crown jewel in Chinese soft power, primarily geared towards Global South regions like the Caribbean.
During Xi Jinping’s tenure thus far as Chinese president, China has only intensified its efforts to woo Caricom member states. A telling example is Xi’s address to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) Forum, held in Beijing on May 13 – which I analysed in my recent article for The Diplomat magazine.
This forum was attended by a number of delegations from Caricom member states, which were also represented at a meeting between Caricom foreign ministers and their Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. This latter meeting – which delved into a range of subject-specific areas that inform several dimensions of China-Caribbean relations – took place in the margins of the China-Celac Forum.
Most significantly, such diplomatic developments are playing out in the wider context of Beijing’s charm offensive toward the Caribbean. But an even deeper concern for Washington is Beijing’s prioritisation of the Caribbean in the context of a rising China’s strategic interests, which – according to analysis published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy – centre on the quest “to erode US global hegemony.”
As it competes for geopolitical advantage relative to the United States, for example, China is laser-focused on the “One China” principle. China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, and it is prepared to assert this claim through military force. Beijing has upped the ante by a war of words with Taipei, which has landed in the People’s Liberation Army’s crosshairs in recent years.
As I outlined in another article for The Diplomat magazine, published in 2022, some Caricom member states have not shied away from involving themselves in such high-stakes diplomatic episodes.
St Vincent and the Grenadines, which is among a handful of Caricom member states that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, has been particularly outspoken.
Five of the independent Caricom member states have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which has steadily lost ground in the region relative to China. The nine other member states unequivocally embrace the “One China” policy and they have formal diplomatic relations with China.
Historically, Taiwan and China have tussled for recognition in the Caribbean. Analysts have identified four main indicators to predict shifts in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, as follows: “dollar diplomacy and promises of development assistance from the PRC [People’s Republic of China], requests for significant financial aid from Taiwan, PRC investment in regional neighbours, and changes in trade patterns between the PRC and Taiwan’s allies.”
What is more, other commentators maintain that “China’s growing and expanding global influence and increasing acceptance of the One China policy are also major related factors behind Taiwan’s loss of allies.”
Arguably, this trend also undermines American power. Washington is attuned to the view of analysts that “(i)n Latin America and the Caribbean, diplomatic flips from Taiwan to the PRC have been the latter’s fastest vehicle for expanding its presence and influence in individual countries.”
This is at a time when, both on the international stage and in the Global South context, China has come into its own. The Xi era, China experts argue, “has heralded a new ... more assertive (Chinese) foreign policy.” Xi, who in 2023 secured an unprecedented third term as China’s president, is widely seen as having provided a fillip to China’s rise.
China, notwithstanding its current economic woes, emerged as a global player thanks in large part to its entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001.
Geopolitically, too, China is a force to be reckoned with. Many experts believe China has “benefited strategically” from the Ukraine war, adding to its already considerable geopolitical heft. This has not gone unnoticed in the Caribbean.
Yet Caricom member states that for decades have aligned themselves with the One China policy are clear-eyed about their motivations in so doing. According to Caricom insiders, “Their relationships with China … are rooted in development cooperation, not ideology or military alignment.” To these states, the BRI is integral to this kind of foreign policy thinking.
It remains an open question whether this foreign policy stance holds water in Trump 2.0 era Washington, which is going all out to notch wins regarding Sino-American competition.
Early leader-level diplomacy, capped off by a series of face-to-face meetings involving US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, characterised the Caricom bloc’s response to Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency.
The heads of government of seven Caricom member states met in-person with Rubio in Washington on May 6 in the latest high-level attempt to strengthen relations. Previously, on the occasion of Rubio’s two-day visit to three Caricom member states in March, six other Caribbean leaders had bilateral engagements with the United states’ top diplomat.
Caricom’s foreign policy apparatus – helmed by regional foreign ministers – sought to gauge how such diplomacy has unfolded to date, focusing on the Trump 2.0 administration’s emergent foreign policy dispensation.
In their two-day meeting, which got underway on May 8 in St. Kitts and Nevis, foreign ministers expressed concern that Caricom-US relations have been weighed down by the strain of Trump 2.0 era “America First” foreign policy.
They also recognised the need to come up with plans and recommendations to strengthen relations, paying special attention to the outcomes of initial leader-level diplomacy.
The communique issued after this meeting suggested there is agreement “that the Community should continue to advocate for multilateral engagement and to avail itself of all opportunities to pursue advocacy with the US Government on issues of priority concern for Caricom.”
Caribbean leaders had already been exchanging views on the merits of such an approach, as they considered next steps in member states’ build-out of Caricom-US relations in the Trump 2.0 era.
The emerging consensus of the regional grouping’s foreign policy establishment places an emphasis on the importance of “follow-through,” contending further that “there is much work still to be done by both sides.”
For their part, Caribbean leaders have made no secret of their view that Caricom-US relations are experiencing a sharp reorientation.
At a summit in Barbados in February 2025, just a few weeks before some of them met with Rubio, Caribbean leaders had concluded “that their countries are facing a radically changing international environment and different U.S. policies constructed around America First.”
What makes this moment especially unsettling for CARICOM-U.S. relations is the Trump administration’s transactional, hardball approach to foreign policy, embodies by its bracing “Liberation Day” pronouncement on April 2. The administration sought to further tighten the screws on U.S. trading partners, telegraphing the imposition of tariffs on virtually every one of them.
This much-publicized Trump administration foreign policy action threw CARICOM member states for a loop, given the optimism that Rubio’s Caribbean visit had generated just days prior. Trump’s sweeping global tariffs, which also impact CARICOM member states, have put a damper on CARICOM-U.S. relations.
When they met recently, CARICOM foreign ministers “considered recent policy changes implemented by the new administration in the U.S.” – including the “Liberation Day” tariffs. They also took stock of efforts by regional states in the period since to secure relief from the Trump administration, which has now seemingly relented on its global trade war.
In the final analysis, trade is an important aspect of CARICOM-U.S. relations. Above all, as I point out in my recent policy brief for the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, these relations are multidimensional.
The bilateral ties between each of the 14 independent CARICOM member states and the U.S. are crucial for the respective small states. With Trump 2.0 era Washington determined to hold firm regarding the United States’ strategic competition with China, ties with Beijing have emerged as another potential friction point.
An Uphill Climb
That said, as postcolonial states in the international community, all independent CARICOM member states have a proud tradition of pursuing international relations in keeping with their respective national interests. The late Errol Barrow, a Caribbean statesman and the first prime minister of Barbados, captured this conviction perfectly in his statement: “We will be friends of all, satellites of none.”
Beijing and Taipei backers alike within the CARICOM fold understand the stakes of their international relations in those terms, wherein sovereignty is of paramount importance. Accordingly, regardless of the prevailing issue, neither one of these two groups will take kindly to possibly being challenged by third parties. On the matter of sovereignty as the only real currency of and great equalizer in international relations, then, both camps stand together.
Insofar as the Trump administration’s China strategy-related machinations are afoot, CARICOM member states are wary of what may be in store. These countries, which form part of the United States’ so-called “third border,” are paying close attention to what Washington is doing to confront the scale of China’s “footprint” in the wider LAC region. Earlier this year, in the face of relentless pressure from the United States, Panama reportedly withdrew from the BRI. Others in the wider LAC region are in the firing line, as it were, considering the Trump administration’s Monroe Doctrine 2.0 foreign policy narrative.
The State Department’s outline of Trump 2.0’s first 100 days boasted that “nations, including El Salvador, Mexico, and Costa Rica, have taken meaningful steps away from China and toward the United States.” Washington appears keen to force more policy changes on the part of LAC states that it can claim as a “win” in the competition with China.
For CARICOM, the hope remains that it will be able to make headway in its relations with the United States. As far as the current orientation of U.S. diplomacy is concerned, though, the bloc faces an uphill climb in getting its relationship with Washington back on track. Trade policy is just one hurdle. Another is Trump’s hawkish turn on China, set against the backdrop of an increasingly contested and emerging multipolar international system.
In assessing Beijing’s exercise of Chinese soft power in the wider LAC region, many in Washington have grown accustomed to wielding a broad brush. This does not augur well for several Caribbean countries.
Another key takeaway is also clear: How steep of a climb it actually could be for CARICOM hinges on whether the bloc’s member states will be able to get through to the second Trump administration going forward. So far, the bloc’s record of driving forward on multiple fronts is not encouraging.
