Good results infrequently get achieved with no process or a very flawed process. However good results oftentimes are the result of a good process. If we want a high confidence level that we will get a good result, it is a no brainer that we must have a good process.
The Government’s manifesto provides a commitment which, in brief, is to restart a reformed oil refinery to regain fuel security. To date review work was completed by the Ramnarine Committee and an interim report was submitted to the Government on December 4, 2025, with the final report expected in early 2026. It is not clear whether that final report has been completed.
As stated in the newspaper based on a release from the Prime Minister’s Office on December 2026, the refinery restart is technically, commercially and financially viable “given the current market demands for refined products and crude availability.” https://newsday.co.tt/2025/12/06/government-receives-interim-report-on-possible-restart-of-oil-refinery/
Since that release the Minister of Energy attended Energy Week in India in January 2026 and met with interested entities who have considerable experience in owning and operating refineries. A T&T Guardian newspaper article on March 22, stated that the Minister of Energy revealed negotiations are underway with several major players, including Chevron of the United States, the National China Offshore Oil Corporation, Nigeria-based Oando, Indian Oil Corporation and the Oilfield Workers Trade Union’s Patriotic Energies and Technologies, which has submitted a new proposal for consideration.
The article further stated quoted the Minister of Energy, “We have been happily and kindly overwhelmed by expressions of interest in the refinery from companies near and far, domestic, local companies, as well as important actors in Europe, in Africa, from Asia, from the Caribbean and at home here.”
Clarity on the process and who is leading the process for restarting the Guaracara Refinery remains clouded in mystery.
The Office of Public Procurement provides very useful guidance for transparency, integrity and good governance in its publication—Procurement Methods and Procedures. If we apply the methods and procedures, the following questions/comments on the process to restart the Guaracara Refinery come into focus:
1) Competitive or Sole Select — Is it a competitive process, or a sole select process and what is the basis for choosing one versus the next?
If it is going to be a competitive process, then there should be a process of issuing a request for proposals (RFP) from identified and interested capable entities. Through a formal or informal process, has a list of interested capable parties been developed? Has the RFP been developed and issued and if so, what is the closing date for receiving proposals? A comprehensive RFP package with the required technical and other commercial information could take many months to develop and will require a specialised team to do the work. Perhaps this was already done when the previous Government completed its RFP process. With something as complex as the refinery and given the length of time the refinery has been idled, it is not atypical to allow many months for interested parties to perform the required assessments to provide a decent proposal;
2) Sole Select Process — There are clearly identified conditions under which a sole select process can be undertaken, for example for very low-value, urgent or emergency procurements. It seems unlikely in this case that a sole select process is appropriate particularly given the widespread interest that has been expressed.
Regarding the RFP process, there are some very important considerations, which if not already addressed, need to be addressed in any issued RFP package as captured in early articles in the T&T Guardian:
• Utilities — The opportunity cost of the refinery’s natural gas, electricity and water supplies and reliability of these supplies on the refinery performance. Previously Petrotrin enjoyed subsidised prices on all the utilities it used. Will subsidies still be provided and who is going to bear those costs?
• Impacts to Heritage and Paria — Both Heritage and Paria are currently generating profits which are being used to repay the principal and the interest on the former Petrotrin US$850 million bond. If the refinery is restarted, will these profitability entities be negatively impacted and if so, what happens?
• Environmental considerations — Who will be responsible for legacy environmental liabilities and how will future liabilities be delineated and addressed?
• Safe operations — Assuring safe operations for a restarted refinery is going to be of paramount importance. As a refinery restart most likely will be phased, there will be multiple work fronts concurrently on the various utilities and process plants at different stages of the restoration, commissioning, and operations cycle.
Efficient scheduling and effective coordination and communications across the site will be critical for a safe and successful restart. This requires strong leadership, a robust process safety culture, strong systems and processes and trained and competent people. Do we still have the competent human resources available, and will any potential investors provide the critical resources to assure safe operations?
• Iso-butane availability — Prior to shut down of the refinery, iso-butane was provided by PPGPL. Since that time there has been a continued reduction in the production of natural gas liquids by PPGPL due to a combination of lower natural gas volumes for processing and the liquid content of the natural gas. Is there sufficient iso-butane to meet the needs of the Alkylation Unit or would there be a need to import supplemental supplies of iso-butane?
• Unionisation — Will it be a requirement for any interested party to have the OWTU as the continuing, recognised majority union and sole collective bargaining agent?
The passing of the Miscellaneous Provisions (Heritage Petroleum, Paria Fuel Trading and Guaracara Refining Vesting) (Amendment) Bill in parliament seems to suggest that is the case. That certainly can impact on bidders’ interest.
Finally, the workstream for developing the RFP and managing that process requires a team of dedicated resources. Who is managing that process? Is it Trinidad Petroleum Holdings Limited (TPHL) or the Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries, or some other entity?
We are now at mid-year of 2026 and given the limited information on the progress to date, it is hard to imagine that an RFP process could be completed before the end of calendar year 2026. Given the immense complexity even with a successful RFP process where an entity is selected there could be very many months of negotiations to arrive at a final executed agreement. At best assuming there is indeed interest by prospective bidders and there is a team in place to execute this work, the earliest we can expect the execution of an agreement is mid-2027.
Assuming a restart of the refinery two years later the earliest a restart could take place is June 2029. What certainly would be helpful to the population is a clear articulation of the process and expected timelines.
Eugene Tiah is an engineer, who spent his career working in the downstream energy sector in Trinidad and the US.
