Over the past few weeks controversial intelligence and national security issues surrounding wiretapping continue to dominate the headlines. The core of this public debate is a need to ensure that efforts to protect national security interests do not undermine our democratic values. In this regards, many scholars on national security have suggested finding the appropriate balance between protecting national security and respecting civil liberties.
While the necessary balance may be complex, additional consideration may incorporate the expansion of the concept of "national security "to include the protection of democratic values. Significantly, the People's partnership government must consider accountability issues to the electorate in the passage of the Anti-Gang Bill, as there is the potential for the undermining of fundamental rights and freedoms and possible creation of an exceptional state of emergency.
In the fight against crime, consideration should have been given to a temporary emergency legislation with a sunset clause, factored in to deal with the spate of illegal drugs and guns. In many ways, special emergency legislation worked in Belfast, Northern Ireland to contend with terrorist activities. As is well known, one of the essentials of liberal democratic systems is that governments are held accountable for their actions, ultimately through the vehicle of free elections.
They are also held accountable through the ordinary mechanisms of public scrutiny-public reports, complaints processes and media investigations. This accountability mechanism causes elected officials to supervise governmental activity and control the actions of departments and agencies, lest errors or abuses occur and their elected party pays the ultimate price.
Ministers are therefore assigned several portfolios and are held accountable by the legislative branch on behalf of the people. Such executive supervision and control is necessary in the security intelligence arena in particular since the secrecy and sensitivity precludes the possibility of diffuse legislative scrutiny.
Ministerial accountability
While it is quite unfortunate for the press to list the name of the Minister of National Security, as one of those listed persons being wiretapped, it is equally puzzling to know that the Minister in charge of this intelligence was unaware that he was under surveillance by his own officers. That says a lot about what is happening in this Ministry.
After his entry as Minister of National Security, Brigadier John Sandy should have demanded a current report from the security intelligence agencies so that he may be satisfied as to the effectiveness and propriety of their operations.
What has happened in the interim is that the Security Intelligence Agency (SIA) became a regime accountable to no one except its political master, according to newspaper reports. In reviewing the situation, the government could implement a system that could mandate a designated body or individual to be the minister's "eyes and ears" and to supervise the activities on his behalf because the many competing demands of executive branch government may often prevent a minister from carrying out a sufficient degree of supervision.
This is very important for other organs of national security. It is an established fact that intelligence agencies undertake activities are normally carried out covertly. Such activities are not subject to routine democratic scrutiny by parliamentary committees because of their secrecy. In a liberal democratic state like Trinidad and Tobago in which the executive branch is responsible to the people through their elected representatives, it is ministers that must bear primary responsibility for a state's security intelligence activities.
This political responsibility should be undergirded by a hierarchy of individuals to whom operational responsibility is assigned. It should also include a robust component of supervision by ministers who can be held to account by the legislative branch and the public.
The nature of SIAs
While intelligence and security activities are vital to the protection of the state, its institutions and people, its functions can paradoxically risk treading on a liberal democratic state's foundation-its rule of law, its guaranteed rights and freedoms and its principle of openness and accountability.
Any perceived activity that threatens a state's security is usually carried out surreptitiously. In order to counter and monitor these threats, states must operate covertly as well. In doing so, States must use special powers to plant listening devices, monitor telephone calls, decipher codes, dispatch spies, seize computers, intercept-email, exchange data and question people.
While vital to a state's security, these exceptional secretive activities can also pose risks to a liberal democratic society built on the rule of law, on fundamental principles of openness and accountability and on individual rights and freedoms.
If the sanctity of these institutions is to be maintained, while at once protecting national security, states should establish a robust regime for democratic control, oversight and review of security intelligence activities.
It is only through the auspices of such safeguards and scrutiny that a populace can effectively demand security intelligence activities proceed according to preset standards of legality and propriety of success in achieving security goals.
Having gleaned from the activities of the SIA, the People's Partnership can now fully understand and appreciate the relevance and need for oversight mechanisms.
To be continued next week...