In the 1990s, the US media sensationalised the term "superpredator", which described the then-teenaged incipient generation of criminals born during the crack epidemic to drug addicted, violently abusive parents. The term came from Princeton political scientist, John DiIulio, and was recently revisited in a New York Times Retro Report video and story, "When Youth Violence Spurred 'Superpredator' Fear," of April 6, 2014, by Clyde Haberman.
The crack-era children were, the storyline went, feral, without the capacity for compassion or remorse, and would bring an unparalleled crime situation in coming years. But it never materialised. US crime rates are now at historic lows, if incarceration, especially of people of colour, is the highest in the world.
There are several arguments about what changed the superpredator outcome. High incarceration is most likely not the cause of the fall in crime since most of those incarcerated were and are non-violent offenders. It was more likely achieved by a combination of state policy and cultural change. Those ranged from the contentious idea that the availability of abortions and the spread of sex education in schools helped (preventing unwanted children who would be turned into criminals by abusive parents), to the less contentious ones about the decline of the crack-cocaine epidemic thanks to better policing and progressive social policies.
This is relevant to Trinidad & Tobago now, since the gang phenomenon today lines up disturbingly well with the "superpredator" scenario, as we're seeing, thanks to the highly visible irruption in Enterprise. For those interested, a UNDP report titled UNDP Citizen Security Survey, 2012, is available for download. It reveals the composition, numbers and location of the local gangs. They're mostly young men (51 per cent from 18-25, 83 per cent 18-35), 83 per cent African, 13 per cent Indian, and four per cent "Other". They're concentrated in Port of Spain, and the Western and Northern Police Divisions. And most came into being post-2000.
The knee-jerk racial imprecations here have successfully stifled discussion of the issue. In Trinidad, the ethnic composition of the gangs has a very different meaning than in the US–it's not the result of historical racism, or contemporary racism. (As an aside, the report also states (p18) that for 2011, 52 per cent of the victims of violent crime were Indian, compared to 17 per cent African.)
But as to ethnic composition, if it were as simple as historical/racial oppression, then what explains the decline in crime from 1996-2001, and the rebound after 2002? (See p12.) Murders fell below 100 in 1998-9, and confidence in the police rose. The "boom" in crime began from 2001-2 after three elections in three years, the rise of violent, racially charged rhetoric in the public via calypso and unregulated talk radio.
This was accompanied by a continued inflow of illegal immigrants (100,000 in the first decade of this century, according to the Ministry of National Security); and an oil/gas boom and a feeding frenzy enraged by the PNM government of 2002-2007, which brought criminal gangs into the "fold" by making them contractors and "community leaders". What was not obvious during this period was the hollowing out of social institutions which are supposed to be independent of the government, like the civil service, police and judiciary.
Everything above more fact, less opinion, and it's been discussed elsewhere. But in the present Enterprise situation, even taking all that in, one thing that jumps out: that is the centrality of mosques in ravaged communities which have assumed the authority normally associated with the state.
One of the Imams interviewed called the gang members "a generation of vipers". Another interview was with Imam Taulib Searles, who I knew many years ago. I remember him as a decent, honest man, and I would be inclined to take what he says seriously, and his story is congruent with the general narrative of the situation.
From the picture drawn by Imams and community leaders (eg "Robocop"), this community, like others, is in a near feudal state. Not only are the state's presence and authority absent, but the atmosphere is Hobbesian; chaotic and violent. The breakdown of families has left young men without fathers, or the necessities of life, and a justified anger at the prosperous society they see whizzing by them.
What drives these young men's desires is the same thing that drives everyone else's: how to get a share of the wealth? Unfortunately, for them, the routes through education, family, and entrepreneurship are impassable, because the state and necessary institutions do not function. Enter Islam: an organising principle which provides gives them a path to self-realisation, self-respect, and status. More importantly, it provides a choice for people who wish to stay on the straight and narrow, as it were. And this is an important element of the story of Enterprise and similar areas: some people (say the reports) are corrupting Islam, militarising it, and feeding it to impressionable minds.
The result has been that Enterprise and elsewhere have become "no-go" areas, where police fear to tread and there's nothing to counter the belief among residents of being isolated from the authority of the state. In effect, while progressive social policy in the US negated the superpredator outcome, regressive policies from 2002-2010 enabled the outcome here. And no counter-policy has even been attempted during 2010–2015.
Enterprise also repeats a historical pattern many seem to have forgotten: for years before 1990, the Jamaat Al Muslimeen was publicly declaring its feelings of being under attack by the state, and signaling its intention to retaliate. It's not at all far-fetched to suppose the present environment is the sound of history repeating itself more forcefully.