JavaScript is disabled in your web browser or browser is too old to support JavaScript. Today almost all web pages contain JavaScript, a scripting programming language that runs on visitor's web browser. It makes web pages functional for specific purposes and if disabled for some reason, the content or the functionality of the web page can be limited or unavailable.

Saturday, June 14, 2025

Prime Minister's address to the nation

by

20170111

Good evening fel­low cit­i­zens.

Please per­mit me to be­gin this short ad­dress by ex­tend­ing to each and every one of you a bright,&nb­sp;pro­duc­tive, safe and pros­per­ous 2017.

Ear­ly in De­cem­ber it was my ini­tial in­ten­tion to do the usu­al end of year wide-rang­ing ad­dress&nb­sp;but giv­en the sim­mer­ing but very re­al threat of ma­jor dis­tur­bance em­a­nat­ing from the op­er­a­tions&nb­sp;of Petrotrin, I knew what­ev­er the out­come, I would have been re­quired to ad­dress the na­tion on&nb­sp;this par­tic­u­lar chal­lenge, which is of in­ter­est not on­ly to the work­ers and union at Petrotrin but to&nb­sp;each and every cit­i­zen of Trinidad and To­ba­go.

It is about time that you, each and every tax­pay­er, each cit­i­zen, you the share­hold­ers of this&nb­sp;com­pa­ny, get a clear pic­ture of what is hap­pen­ing at Petrotrin and what these de­vel­op­ments&nb­sp;mean to our al­ready very dif­fi­cult na­tion­al cir­cum­stances.

Petrotrin is a whol­ly state-owned in­te­grat­ed com­pa­ny in­volved in ex­plo­ration, pro­duc­tion and&nb­sp;re­fin­ing of crude pe­tro­le­um. Petrotrin is the coun­try's ma­jor oil pro­duc­er, cur­rent­ly ac­count­ing&nb­sp;for more than one-half of the coun­try's to­tal oil pro­duc­tion of about 72,000 bpd and runs the&nb­sp;coun­try's on­ly re­fin­ery, which pro­duces a range of prod­ucts (gaso­line, diesel, jet fu­el and fu­el&nb­sp;oil) for the do­mes­tic mar­ket and for ex­port to the re­gion and in­ter­na­tion­al­ly.

Tra­di­tion­al­ly, the&nb­sp;Com­pa­ny has been a net earn­er of for­eign ex­change, ap­prox­i­mate­ly $250 mil­lion per year in&nb­sp;2015 and 2016. It is al­so an im­por­tant con­trib­u­tor to gov­ern­ment tax rev­enues and a guar­an­tor of&nb­sp;the coun­try's en­er­gy se­cu­ri­ty.&nb­sp;For many years, high in­ter­na­tion­al oil prices masked a range of fun­da­men­tal weak­ness­es in&nb­sp;Petrotrin's op­er­a­tions. Among the main struc­tur­al prob­lems were a steady de­cline in do­mes­tic oil&nb­sp;pro­duc­tion, from 64,000 bpd in 2006 to 42,000 bpd in 2016, low pro­duc­tiv­i­ty, es­ca­lat­ing&nb­sp;man­pow­er costs and steadi­ly in­creas­ing op­er­a­tional and cap­i­tal costs, due to in­ad­e­quate con­trols,&nb­sp;ques­tion­able man­age­ment prac­tices, age­ing as­sets and in­fra­struc­ture.

Petrotrin now has more than 5,000 em­ploy­ees, with an an­nu­al wage bill of $1.9 bil­lion, which is&nb­sp;close to 50 per cent of its to­tal an­nu­al op­er­at­ing costs. This pay­roll ra­tio is ex­cep­tion­al­ly high&nb­sp;even com­pared with that of oth­er state-owned oil com­pa­nies.&nb­sp;

These neg­a­tive fac­tors were com­pound­ed af­ter 2007 by a sig­nif­i­cant in­crease in Petrotrin's debt&nb­sp;bur­den, large­ly due to two ex­ter­nal loans, name­ly a US$ 750 mil­lion loan con­tract­ed in 2007 and&nb­sp;a US$ 850 mil­lion loan, con­tract­ed in 2009, used large­ly to sup­port re­fin­ery up­grade projects,&nb­sp;which were ex­posed to some sig­nif­i­cant mis­man­age­ment and ex­pe­ri­enced siz­able cost es­ca­la­tion.

A dra­mat­ic slump in crude oil prices, com­bined with an on­go­ing de­cline in re­fin­ery mar­gins and&nb­sp;de­clin­ing lo­cal oil pro­duc­tion led to a more than 50 per cent de­crease in the Com­pa­ny's rev­enues,&nb­sp;from TT$37 bil­lion in 2012 to TT$16 bil­lion in 2016. Fur­ther, the de­cline in lo­cal oil pro­duc­tion&nb­sp;in­creased the re­quire­ment for sig­nif­i­cant im­por­ta­tion of for­eign crude oil to ser­vice the Point-a-Pierre&nb­sp;re­fin­ery. This ex­pense, cou­pled with high debt ser­vic­ing costs, and high op­er­at­ing&nb­sp;ex­pen­di­tures (notwith­stand­ing the drop in oil pro­duc­tion) re­sult­ed in the Com­pa­ny reg­is­ter­ing an&nb­sp;af­ter tax loss of TT$ 819 mil­lion in FY 2015 and a pro­ject­ed loss of about TT $ 600 mil­lion in&nb­sp;FY 2016.

Be­cause of acute cash flow prob­lems, caused by its dras­ti­cal­ly re­duced rev­enue,&nb­sp;Petrotrin asked for and re­ceived gov­ern­ment guar­an­tees in 2016, for short term loans up to a&nb­sp;max­i­mum of US$230 mil­lion in or­der to car­ry on its op­er­a­tions and meet its ba­sic fi­nan­cial&nb­sp;oblig­a­tions. Cash flow dif­fi­cul­ties have al­so led to Petrotrin's large ar­rears of pay­ments of

Be­cause of acute cash flow prob­lems, caused by its dras­ti­cal­ly re­duced rev­enue,&nb­sp;Petrotrin asked for and re­ceived gov­ern­ment guar­an­tees in 2016, for short term loans up to a&nb­sp;max­i­mum of US$230 mil­lion in or­der to car­ry on its op­er­a­tions and meet its ba­sic fi­nan­cial&nb­sp;oblig­a­tions. Cash flow dif­fi­cul­ties have al­so led to Petrotrin's large ar­rears of pay­ments of&nb­sp;roy­al­ties and tax­es, which are of the or­der of $1.2 bil­lion, (net of out­stand­ing fu­el sub­si­dies).

In&nb­sp;oth­er words, when you net off the mon­ey owed by the State to Petrotrin at this time for the fu­el&nb­sp;sub­sidy against the roy­al­ties and tax­es be­long­ing to the state but with­held by Petrotrin, the&nb­sp;com­pa­ny cur­rent­ly owes the Trea­sury $1.2 bil­lion in un­paid tax­es!

Ad­di­tion­al­ly, be­cause of an un­favourable oil price out­look and the Com­pa­ny's high debt ser­vice&nb­sp;bur­den, which in­cludes a bal­loon pay­ment in 2019 of US$850 mil­lion or TT$5.8 bil­lion,&nb­sp;Moody's In­vestors Ser­vice down­grad­ed Petrotrin's cred­it rat­ing in March 2016 from Ba1 to Ba3.

Fur­ther, in April 2016 an­oth­er rat­ings agency, Stan­dard and Poor's (S&P), af­firmed Petrotrin's&nb­sp;"BB" rat­ings, in the ex­pec­ta­tion that the Gov­ern­ment would con­tin­ue to pro­vide the re­quired&nb­sp;bud­getary sup­port to Petrotrin, as need­ed. In oth­er words Petrotrin, in its cur­rent form, is&nb­sp;some­what of a ward of the na­tion­al trea­sury, heav­i­ly de­pen­dent on the tax­pay­er who is al­ready&nb­sp;strug­gling to make ends meet.

Stan­dard and Poors (S&P) warned, how­ev­er, that Petrotrin could face up to a two-notch&nb­sp;down­grade if the Com­pa­ny's liq­uid­i­ty weak­ened be­cause of an in­crease in its deficit; or if, in&nb­sp;S&P's view, Gov­ern­ment's sup­port for Petrotrin had fall­en from 'very high' to "high". This is not&nb­sp;sole­ly a Petrotrin prob­lem, it is al­so a sit­u­a­tion which is ever present in all dis­cus­sions of the&nb­sp;na­tion­al bor­row­ings and debt ser­vic­ing and the down­grade could eas­i­ly stretch be­yond Petrotrin&nb­sp;on­to the op­er­a­tions of the Min­istry of Fi­nance.

With re­spect to wage ne­go­ti­a­tions for new col­lec­tive agree­ments for its var­i­ous bar­gain­ing units,&nb­sp;these ne­go­ti­a­tions be­gan in 2013 be­tween the OW­TU and Petrotrin, for the pe­ri­od 2011 to&nb­sp;2014/2015. The of­fer from the com­pa­ny at the time was ze­ro-ze­ro-ze­ro per­cent in­crease in&nb­sp;salaries and wages for the 2011 to 2014/2015 pe­ri­od.&nb­sp;

In­ci­den­tal­ly, this was the time of high oil prices and when oth­er em­ploy­ees on the state pay­roll&nb­sp;were be­ing of­fered in­creas­es of 14 per cent. The OW­TU did not ac­cept the of­fer of a ze­ro&nb­sp;per­cent in­crease, but Petrotrin main­tained its po­si­tion of ze­ro from 2013 through­out to the time&nb­sp;of the Gen­er­al Elec­tions of Sep­tem­ber 2015.

Since no agree­ment could be reached, the ne­go­ti­a­tions moved from bi­lat­er­al dis­cus­sions to&nb­sp;con­cil­i­a­tion at the Min­istry of Labour and then in 2014, the 2011-2014/2015 col­lec­tive&nb­sp;agree­ment was sent to the In­dus­tri­al Court for a de­ter­mi­na­tion, where it is still un­der Court&nb­sp;man­age­ment.

Fol­low­ing this, on De­cem­ber 5, 2016, Petrotrin and the OW­TU al­so start­ed ne­go­ti­a­tions 2014 to&nb­sp;2017/2018 pe­ri­od. Petrotrin once again of­fered an in­crease of ze­ro per­cent for the 2014 to&nb­sp;2017/2018 pe­ri­od.

How­ev­er, this of­fer, un­like the pre­vi­ous of­fer of ze­ro per­cent made in 2013&nb­sp;un­der the pre­vi­ous Gov­ern­ment, was not guid­ed by the Cor­po­ra­tion Sole. Fur­ther, short­ly af­ter&nb­sp;ne­go­ti­a­tions com­menced, the Union re­port­ed a break­down in bi­lat­er­al dis­cus­sions, and the mat­ter&nb­sp;quick­ly pro­gressed to for­mal con­cil­i­a­tion and then to the serv­ing of strike no­tice by the OW­TU.

It should be not­ed that where­as in late De­cem­ber the Union moved de­ter­mined­ly to­wards strike&nb­sp;ac­tion on Petrotrin for its sec­ond of­fer of a ze­ro per­cent in­crease for the 2014 to 2017/2018&nb­sp;pe­ri­od, it did not do so in 2013, when it was faced with a Gov­ern­ment sanc­tioned of­fer of ze­ro&nb­sp;per­cent for the 2011 to 2014/2015 pe­ri­od.

The OW­TU orig­i­nal­ly pro­posed a 10 per cent in­crease for the pe­ri­od 2011 to 2014/2015 pe­ri­od&nb­sp;and a sim­i­lar in­crease for the 2014 to 2017/2018 pe­ri­od. Petrotrin has ad­vised that the Union's&nb­sp;pro­pos­al for the pe­ri­od 2011 to 2014/2015, would have in­creased the an­nu­al wage bill by $165&nb­sp;mil­lion, in ad­di­tion to cre­at­ing a back-pay li­a­bil­i­ty of over $600 mil­lion up to the end of 2016.

The ad­di­tion­al cost for the 2014 to 2017/2018 pe­ri­od, if a fur­ther 10% was giv­en for this pe­ri­od,&nb­sp;would be an­oth­er $180 mil­lion per year, on top of the ad­di­tion­al $165 mil­lion an­nu­al cost for the&nb­sp;pre­vi­ous pe­ri­od, and an­oth­er $200 mil­lion in back­pay in 2017.

Over the past few years, Petrotrin's rev­enue stream has not been able to sup­port its cur­rent cost&nb­sp;struc­ture. Ac­cord­ing­ly, giv­en the out­look of oil prices these kinds of in­creas­es would have&nb­sp;con­tributed to con­tin­u­ing siz­able loss­es, to be fi­nanced through in­creased bor­row­ing by the&nb­sp;Com­pa­ny. It is worth not­ing that Petrotrin's debt is cur­rent­ly at TT$ 13.2 bil­lion, and that high&nb­sp;debt ser­vice charges are among the main caus­es of the Com­pa­ny's weak fi­nan­cial state.

It is al­so&nb­sp;to be not­ed that any such bor­row­ing to meet these needs would of ne­ces­si­ty have to be se­cured&nb­sp;by guar­an­tees by the tax­pay­er base and such li­a­bil­i­ties would be­come part and par­cel of the&nb­sp;na­tion­al debt with all the at­ten­dant neg­a­tive con­se­quences.

In the ab­sence of Petrotrin's abil­i­ty to bor­row on its own mer­it, the wage in­creas­es that the&nb­sp;OW­TU had asked for would have had to be fi­nanced ei­ther by Gov­ern­ment trans­fers or by&nb­sp;gov­ern­ment-guar­an­teed debt. Ei­ther op­tion would car­ry se­ri­ous pit­falls for the en­tire coun­try. It is to be re­called that the Cen­tral Gov­ern­ment is in the process of im­ple­ment­ing a fis­cal&nb­sp;con­sol­i­da­tion plan, geared to re­duc­ing its cur­rent fis­cal im­bal­ance, caused in part, by the sharp&nb­sp;drop in en­er­gy prices.

This pro­gramme is un­der­pinned by the US$1 bil­lion bond is­sue, re­cent­ly&nb­sp;sourced in in­ter­na­tion­al mar­kets. Pro­vid­ing cur­rent trans­fers to Petrotrin or guar­an­tee­ing&nb­sp;Petrotrin's long term debt would cer­tain­ly jeop­ar­dize the coun­try's sov­er­eign debt rat­ing, which is&nb­sp;up for re­view with­in the next few months.

It is note­wor­thy that Petrotrin had told us in the event of a strike, it would en­sure that&nb­sp;arrange­ments were in place to main­tain con­tin­u­ous sup­plies of fu­el to lo­cal con­sumers, and we&nb­sp;were con­fi­dent that this would have been achieved. But a strike would al­so have forced&nb­sp;sus­pen­sion of its ex­port busi­ness and in this con­text, it should be not­ed that 75 per­cent of the&nb­sp;Com­pa­ny's sales re­ceipts comes from ex­ports to re­gion­al and in­ter­na­tion­al mar­kets.

With the need to sus­pend ex­port sales, in the event of a strike, Petrotrin's gross re­ceipts would&nb­sp;have de­clined by three-quar­ters and its for­eign ex­change earn­ings would have dried up. Petrotrin&nb­sp;had es­ti­mat­ed that, with­out Gov­ern­ment in­ter­ven­tion by way of an ap­pli­ca­tion to the In­dus­tri­al&nb­sp;Court un­der the In­dus­tri­al Re­la­tions Act for a stop or­der in the na­tion­al in­ter­est, the planned&nb­sp;strike would have caused a net in­come loss of close to TT$500 mil­lion dur­ing the po­ten­tial 90-day pe­ri­od of the strike.

It is dif­fi­cult to ac­cu­rate­ly pre­dict what would have been the im­pact of a three-month strike at&nb­sp;Petrotrin and the huge­ly neg­a­tive ef­fect such ac­tion would have had on the econ­o­my at large. It&nb­sp;would have been sig­nif­i­cant, far more than the es­ti­mat­ed $500 mil­lion loss by Petrotrin alone.&nb­sp;

As you know, the Union served for­mal strike no­tice on Petrotrin on Wednes­day Jan­u­ary 4, 2017,&nb­sp;and the strike was sched­uled to start on Mon­day Jan­u­ary 9, 2017.&nb­sp;How­ev­er, af­ter many long hours of ne­go­ti­a­tions, and care­ful and in-depth de­lib­er­a­tion and&nb­sp;ex­am­i­na­tion by the Gov­ern­ment, over the week­end, Petrotrin was giv­en di­rec­tions by the&nb­sp;Cor­po­ra­tion Sole on Mon­day morn­ing to of­fer the OW­TU an in­ter­im in­crease of 5% in salaries&nb­sp;and wages for the 2011 to 2014/2015 pe­ri­od, to be paid im­me­di­ate­ly at the next pay­ment cy­cle.

This in­ter­im of­fer of 5% was au­tho­rized ON CON­DI­TION that the Union with­drew its strike&nb­sp;no­tice for the 2014 to 2017/2018 pe­ri­od, and de­ferred con­sid­er­a­tion of the col­lec­tive agree­ment&nb­sp;for the 2014 to 2017/2018 pe­ri­od to a lat­er date, and re­turn to the ne­go­ti­at­ing ta­ble, in good faith,&nb­sp;with a view to fi­nal­iz­ing by Feb­ru­ary 28, 2017, the terms of the 2011 to 2014/2015 col­lec­tive&nb­sp;agree­ment.

Most im­por­tant­ly, all pay­ment of back­pay for the 2011 to 2014/2015 pe­ri­od was to be de­ferred&nb­sp;un­til tar­gets are achieved. These in­clude im­proved pro­duc­tiv­i­ty, in­creased oil pro­duc­tion and the&nb­sp;Com­pa­ny's re­turn to prof­itabil­i­ty.&nb­sp;The bench­marks that would trig­ger the tim­ing of the back­pay pay­ments are al­so to be ne­go­ti­at­ed&nb­sp;by the par­ties by the end of Feb­ru­ary 2017.

The OW­TU ac­cept­ed this of­fer and the strike was called off. The cur­rent dis­pute over wage&nb­sp;in­creas­es for the 2014-2017/2018 was al­so re­ferred to the In­dus­tri­al Court by agree­ment.&nb­sp;It is es­ti­mat­ed that this in­ter­im in­crease of 5% will im­me­di­ate­ly in­crease Petrotrin's wage bill by&nb­sp;$81 mil­lion per year, and the back­pay li­a­bil­i­ty aris­ing from the in­ter­im of­fer would be in ex­cess&nb­sp;of $300 mil­lion.

In or­der not to un­du­ly bur­den the na­tion­al Trea­sury, the Com­pa­ny has been di­rect­ed by the&nb­sp;Gov­ern­ment that it must take firm and im­me­di­ate steps to re­duce its an­nu­al op­er­a­tional&nb­sp;ex­pen­di­ture in or­der to meet the in­creased wage costs of $81 mil­lion per year. This as­sign­ment&nb­sp;will be care­ful­ly mon­i­tored by the Cor­po­ra­tion Sole to see that the Com­pa­ny achieves its cost-cut­ting&nb­sp;tar­gets.&nb­sp;

Pri­or to the flare up as ex­pe­ri­enced in the last three weeks, you would re­call that in my last&nb­sp;ad­dress to you, I flagged the Petrotrin chal­lenge and said to you that it was the Gov­ern­ment's&nb­sp;in­ten­tion to en­gage the OW­TU on the is­sue of the fu­ture of the com­pa­ny.

We are at that stage&nb­sp;now even as it has been pre­cip­i­tat­ed by wage de­mand is­sues.&nb­sp;In the in­ter­ven­ing pe­ri­od, pri­or to the labour dis­pute, some pre­lim­i­nary con­tacts were had and the&nb­sp;Gov­ern­ment agreed to re­ceive from the Union any and all of its thoughts with re­spect to the&nb­sp;im­prove­ment of con­di­tions and per­for­mance at the com­pa­ny. One such re­sponse, the first, was&nb­sp;sub­mit­ted to the Gov­ern­ment last Fri­day and will be giv­en the due con­sid­er­a­tions it de­serves.

This Cab­i­net op­er­ates a sub-Com­mit­tee on En­er­gy. It is pop­u­lat­ed by a wide cross sec­tion of&nb­sp;some of the na­tion's best in­tel­lect and ex­pe­ri­ence, cur­rent and re­tired, dis­tilled from the&nb­sp;hy­dro­car­bon in­dus­try, sup­port­ed by world class ex­perts from the in­ter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty. The&nb­sp;de­ci­sion mak­ing of the Cab­i­net is be­ing guid­ed by this ef­fort and the dis­cus­sions are on their way&nb­sp;to the Par­lia­ment for the in­volve­ment of the Stand­ing Com­mit­tee on En­er­gy. This ap­proach al­so&nb­sp;in­cludes the re­port of the gas mas­ter­plan which has been the sub­ject of ex­ten­sive re­view by the&nb­sp;Gov­ern­ment.

The unique and par­tic­u­lar sit­u­a­tion at Petrotrin, es­pe­cial­ly its debt prob­lem, has been un­der&nb­sp;spe­cif­ic re­port to the sub-Com­mit­tee and for­mer Fi­nance Min­is­ter Wen­dell Mot­t­ley and fi­nan­cial&nb­sp;ex­perts have been tasked with ad­vis­ing the Cab­i­net on the way for­ward. A re­port of their work is&nb­sp;on its way to the Cab­i­net for con­sid­er­a­tion.&nb­sp;

Notwith­stand­ing any oth­er con­sid­er­a­tion the one thing which is clear is that you the tax­pay­ers,&nb­sp;you the share­hold­ers can­not con­tin­ue to turn a blind eye or be un­in­ter­est­ed in the chal­lenges at&nb­sp;Petrotrin, a com­pa­ny which is so cen­tral to our for­tunes and which pos­es such threats as&nb­sp;de­scribed. The cur­rent sit­u­a­tion can­not be left to limp along un­at­tend­ed.

It is the in­ten­tion of this Gov­ern­ment to take the best ad­vice, con­sult as wide­ly as we have to but&nb­sp;in the end take all nec­es­sary steps to re­spond to the chal­lenges and to po­si­tion the com­pa­ny to&nb­sp;re­alise its fullest po­ten­tial so that it can de­liv­er on the promise not on­ly of good jobs for those&nb­sp;who are for­tu­nate enough to be em­ployed there but to the wider na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty which&nb­sp;de­pends on the com­pa­ny's suc­cess and have to be pro­tect­ed from any chron­ic mis­ad­ven­tures&nb­sp;which may be spawned there.

These are dif­fi­cult times but these are al­so times of great op­por­tu­ni­ties.&nb­sp;Even though the com­pa­ny is an in­te­grat­ed op­er­a­tion the weight of our cap­i­tal spend­ing, as we all&nb­sp;know monies of­ten not well spent, has been on re­fin­ery op­er­a­tions at the ex­pense of oil and gas&nb­sp;pro­duc­tion, whether on land or off- shore.

Be­cause of fi­nan­cial con­straints at both the lev­el of the state and the com­pa­ny, rec­ti­fy­ing this&nb­sp;im­bal­ance now can on­ly be ef­fect­ed by im­ports of ex­ter­nal and do­mes­tic cap­i­tal as well as new&nb­sp;tech­nol­o­gy in­to oil and gas pro­duc­tion at Petrotrin.&nb­sp;Sur­vival de­pends on such a suc­cess­ful im­port de­mand­ing the co­op­er­a­tion of all the com­pa­ny's&nb­sp;stake hold­ers. In this ap­proach there will be op­por­tu­ni­ties for lo­cal eq­ui­ty in­vest­ment and&nb­sp;em­ploy­ee stock own­er­ship in a fu­ture prof­itably re­struc­tured com­pa­ny.

The ques­tion is, are we up to the task of grasp­ing these ex­cit­ing pos­si­bil­i­ties or will we be stuck&nb­sp;in the past of failed con­fronta­tions and fin­ger point­ing. Time is not on our side. We must act with&nb­sp;de­ci­sive­ness and clar­i­ty if we are to give our­selves the best chance to suc­ceed.&nb­sp;It is the Gov­ern­ment's du­ty to do right for all the peo­ple of our na­tion. In our jour­ney of progress&nb­sp;we have of­ten times de­toured to our detri­ment.

We are called up­on then to face up to our&nb­sp;re­al­i­ties. Petrotrin is prob­a­bly as good a place to start. Even if we have oth­er ideas, the press­ing&nb­sp;chal­lenges sur­round­ing this ma­jor state en­ter­prise de­mand im­me­di­ate ac­tion whether it is&nb­sp;strength­ened man­age­ment, im­proved ac­count­abil­i­ty, re­struc­tur­ing of its shape and busi­ness&nb­sp;mod­el, geared to­wards in­creased pro­duc­tion, bet­ter pro­duc­tiv­i­ty and sus­tained prof­itabil­i­ty.

The Gov­ern­ment will act as is nec­es­sary and I ap­peal to all in­volved to see our cir­cum­stance as a&nb­sp;na­tion­al pre­rog­a­tive re­quir­ing rea­son and ma­tu­ri­ty. We can rise to the oc­ca­sion as we pre­scribe&nb­sp;our own bit­ter med­i­cine which must be so dis­tilled to take us to a place of eco­nom­ic good health,&nb­sp;peace and so­cial jus­tice.&nb­sp;Let me end by reaf­firm­ing my com­mit­ment that this Gov­ern­ment will do all that has to be done&nb­sp;to keep our coun­try out of the grip of the lender of last re­sort, the IMF.

Fail­ure to fix the Petrotrin prob­lem and sim­i­lar prob­lems leave us vul­ner­a­ble. We have the&nb­sp;re­solve and we have the op­por­tu­ni­ty. Let us go brave and do it, for the ben­e­fit of all our peo­ple.&nb­sp;We have avert­ed a ma­jor dis­rup­tion which would have con­sid­er­ably wors­ened our sit­u­a­tion and&nb­sp;for that, on your be­half, I must thank all who were di­rect­ly in­volved and their ad­vis­ers.&nb­sp;

How­ev­er, let us not for one minute be­lieve that we have dealt with or have solved the prob­lem.&nb­sp;Com­fort­ing as it is, as we ex­haled, it is not even the be­gin­ning of the end. If I may quote the&nb­sp;well-known Churchillian state­ment "It is the end of the be­gin­ning." Let us make this a time of&nb­sp;change, change for the bet­ter, with bound­less faith in our des­tiny.&nb­sp;Petrotrin is an in­te­gral and a ma­jor part of our des­tiny. Let us re­solve to do what has to be done&nb­sp;to fix it so that when I ad­dress you again in the not too dis­tant fu­ture the pic­ture would be&nb­sp;brighter and the num­bers will be more com­fort­ing.

Thank you and good night.


Related articles

Sponsored

Weather

PORT OF SPAIN WEATHER

Sponsored