kevon.felmine@guardian.co.tt
Health, Safety and Environment technician Andrew Dopson says he was unaware that Land and Marine Contracting Services (LMCS) divers were removing the migration barrier that caused the deadly Differential Pressure (Delta P), which ultimately led to the death of four divers.
Under examination at the Commission of Enquiry (CoE) into the Paria/LMCS Diving Tragedy at the International Waterfront Centre, Port-of-Spain, yesterday, Dopson said he did not have instructions that divers would remove the barrier (plugs) that day.
The removal of this barrier led to LMCS divers Christopher Boodram, Kazim Ali Jr, Fyzal Kurban, Yusuf Henry and Rishi Nagassar getting sucked into the 30-inch diameter pipeline they worked on at Berth No.6 in the Pointe-a-Pierre harbour. Boodram escaped the pipe, but the others died while awaiting rescue.
Asked by CoE counsel Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj what action he would have taken if he knew, Dopson said: “I would have asked the contractor supervisor to halt the operation.”
Dopson, a Kenson Operations Ltd employee stationed part-time at Paria Fuel Trading’s HSE department, said his function on February 25 was to periodically check the hot work operations on the LMCS crane barge and compressor. He also had to conduct atmospheric testing in the hyperbaric chamber where the divers worked. His duty was not to continuously monitor the work.
The migration barrier inside the riser at Sealine No.36 consisted of mechanical and inflatable plugs. The mechanical plug prevented objects from falling onto the inflatable plug. The inflatable plug prevented hydrocarbon fumes in the pipeline from entering the chamber.
Dopson said he would have asked the contractor to stop removing the migration barrier because it would have affected the air quality inside the chamber.
Dopson was aware of the screen to monitor the divers in the chamber and saw the men removing a solid blank. Although he did not get instructions to observe the screen continuously, he agreed with Lynch that it was prudent to do so.
Based on the Toolbox Meeting that morning, Dopson said that after removing the blank, the next step was to install the new riser. He said it was not his duty to stay and oversee the task but the contractor’s.
Dopson agreed with Maharaj that if he had remained after seeing the divers remove the blank, he could have stopped the work, preventing the incident. He said that based on the HSE department’s function, Paria did not assign anyone to monitor the work constantly.
Dopson also confirmed that Christopher Boodram, the lone survivor, was lucid when he emerged from the line and shouted that the divers were still alive and that Kurban was right behind him. He said the only thing Boodram did not know was the time of the day and how long he stayed inside the pipeline.
Dopson said Paria suspended LMCS’s permit for work in the chamber but could not tell if it included diving. He said he saw LMCS divers in the water and did not see the Coast Guard preventing them from swimming.
Dopson made a report of the day’s event on his phone, which did not include the removal of the barrier on that day.
He agreed with Paria’s counsel, Gilbert Peterson SC that if the Toolbox Meeting included the removal of the plugs, he would have included it in his report.
“I am not an expert in this field of subsea, so it was important for me to gather the steps as discussed in the Toolbox Meeting, and there is an order in which it has to go. It is my opinion that if we skip a step here, we are in trouble.”
However, he said he would not know if LMCS skipped a step.
Former acting offshore team lead at Paria, Visham Harrichan, said in his witness statement that clearing Sealine No.36 in preparation for the work was to safeguard LMCS employees, personnel, other workers and the facilities from the risks of fire and explosion.
But like LMCS managing director Kazim Ali Snr, he could not say how much oil got removed from the line.
Harrichan also agreed that in preparing the works, none of the documents identified Delta P as a hazard. In reflection, he said draining the line was an important aspect of executing the work. If he had to do it again, he said he would look closely at the volume of oil in the pipeline.
Harrichand had not seen the Incorr-Tech report on the incident. The report identified that removing fuel oil from the line and installing the barrier stipulated in Paria’s Scope of Works created a large gaseous void in Sealine No.36. This void was a prerequisite for the latent Delta P hazard created. It found that both Paria and LMCS overlooked the hazard, which existed at the onset of work in the chamber and became active when divers attempted to remove the inflatable plug.
Unaware of the condition incorporating a gaseous void, the divers began to deflate the inflatable plug after safely removing the mechanical seal. On reaching a reduced pressure of 11.4 PSIG, the resistive force of the seal was lower than the downward force, trusting it down into the oily pipe, creating the vortex that sucked the divers into the line.
Now aware of the findings, Harrichan agreed the draining of the underwater line should have been closely monitored. He said he thought LMCS and Paria’s Maintenance Department did this.
Harrichan left Paria on May 9 for another job.