Crime has been a burning national issue for many years. The Scott drug Report established a benchmark. The events of 1990 demonstrated that guns could be sourced and the state apparatus challenged. By 1999 Basdeo Panday was exasperated, complaining that he did not know what further measures could be deployed to reduce the growing crime wave. Yet, crime grew even as the national economy grew and unemployment fell, a contradiction
Violent, gun-related crime has continued to grow, feeding public anxiety and increasing the demand for a permanent solution. COVID, like the UNC’s State of Emergency in 2011, provided only a temporary respite and the recent upsurge has generated more strident calls for action, a crime plan or any plan that would lower the crime and murder rate.
Governments have acted in the past, though the actions have been largely ineffective. In a rare bipartisan move, Manning and Panday reformed (deformed?) the selection process for Commissioner of Police (CoP). Since then, we have had more acting CoPs for a longer period than we have had substantive commissioners. The last two substantive commissioners, Gibbs and Griffith, demitted office early without clear evidence that either had made a substantial improvement in the crime situation.
There were changes to the anti-crime apparatus. The professionals in SAUTT ended kidnapping for ransom. Instituted by one administration, it was dismantled by the other. The same with the national security apparatus and information systems. The 360-degree radar network is either not working or not inadequately manned. Recently, the National Security Minister owned up to the parlous situation with the national security cameras, where less than 50 per cent are not working and seemed unable to say when this situation would be corrected.
The Air Guard helicopters purchased by one administration were abandoned because they were ‘too expensive to maintain’ and two other helicopters spent the duration of their leases in a hangar, unused because they were not registered for local use. The Coast Guard vessels acquired for drug interdiction use seem to have had little effect, either because they were inadequately maintained, or infrequently deployed.
Amendments to the Bail Act have come and gone, and the Anti-Gang legislation seems either to be useless or unenforced. An attorney general disclosed the number of criminal gangs and their areas of operations in a parliamentary session. Routinely, the police indicate that crime victims are well known to them. There is a comprehensive anti-money laundering system to prohibit and detect money laundering and the proceeds of crime, given that T&T has been a known drug transshipment centre for many years. To date, these mechanisms have been unsuccessful in detecting or prosecuting crime.
Yet, important ballistic devices and relevant forensic personnel remain in short supply as gun crimes exponentially increase. In 2019, then police commissioner Gary Griffith said a ballistic report to determine which side fired the fatal bullet that killed 14-year-old Naomi Nelson in a shootout in Carenage would take six years. How long does it take to get ballistics reports for woundings and robberies?
The public ‘hopes’ that a CoP would ‘instil fear’ into the criminal gangs with military precision, ‘one shot one kill’, expecting that such aggressiveness would curb lawlessness. Or a crime plan (operation anaconda et al) would. By focusing on the ‘goal’ of fixing crime, critics are delusional, hoping that a ‘saviour’ would come to significantly crime.
Martin Joseph, an underappreciated, long-serving national security minister, was ridiculed for saying that fixing crime was a process that would take time. Twelve years after he demitted office, the situation has worsened and clearly cannot be fixed overnight. Indeed, the crime detection rate cannot improve without first improving the crime detection machinery. For starters, the Director of Public Prosecution’s office must be adequately staffed, and forensics, ballistics capabilities, and court processes upgraded. Paralleling these improvements, the professional skills, capacities, and discipline in the police service must also be improved, and the administrative structures must be made more robust.
To reduce crime to a more manageable level, a holistic, multifaceted approach must be adopted to address the root causes of crime in addition to better policing. This includes confronting deep-rooted social issues, poor performance at school and reducing the number of dropouts.
What gets measured gets managed. Objectives need to be set, and the performance monitored and measured. That is the role of the Police Service Commission. It cannot simply be left to the public to monitor the performance of the CoP. And measurement must mean more than robber talk and emotive commentary and judgment. The public must be confident that the system works and would only be assured if they can discern measurable improvements.
These changes require money and political will. Priorities must be set, and tough decisions made in the budget allocation process. By focusing on goals that are impossible to deliver in the short run, we are creating the opportunity for ‘plausible illusion’ by giving politicians the authority to promise the earth even as the promiser and the audience both understand the emptiness of such a promise. Fixing crime is a process, and it will take time.
