The Caribbean to­day is at a crit­i­cal junc­ture. The re­cent as­sertive pres­ence of the Unit­ed States in re­gion­al wa­ters, par­tic­u­lar­ly its no-non­sense ap­proach to coun­ter­ing nar­co-traf­fick­ing and mon­i­tor­ing threats em­a­nat­ing to and from Venezuela, has un­der­scored what many se­cu­ri­ty ex­perts have long warned: re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty is not op­tion­al, it is ex­is­ten­tial. The ur­gency of the mo­ment de­mands that Caribbean na­tions, par­tic­u­lar­ly Cari­com, recog­nise and treat re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty as the de­ci­sive pil­lar up­on which our sta­bil­i­ty, growth, and sus­tain­able de­vel­op­ment are built. Geopo­lit­i­cal­ly, the Caribbean is not an iso­lat­ed en­clave; it is a strate­gic tran­sit zone. The re­gion is in­creas­ing­ly caught be­tween hemi­spher­ic dy­nam­ics, ris­ing ten­sions be­tween Venezuela and its neigh­bours, shift­ing al­liances, and ex­ter­nal pow­ers po­si­tion­ing for in­flu­ence. These re­al­i­ties el­e­vate the Caribbean from a per­ceived pe­riph­ery to a cen­tral stag­ing ground for se­cu­ri­ty and sta­bil­i­ty in the Amer­i­c­as.

The pres­ence of the US mar­itime forces and mil­i­tary as­sets in our wa­ters is not by chance. It re­flects a re­sponse to the deeply en­trenched nar­co-traf­fick­ing net­works and transna­tion­al or­gan­ised crime that have erod­ed in­sti­tu­tions, desta­bilised com­mu­ni­ties, and cor­rupt­ed le­git­i­mate eco­nom­ic sys­tems. For Cari­com states, the spillover ef­fects of gun traf­fick­ing, gang pro­lif­er­a­tion, hu­man smug­gling, and arms-for-drugs ex­changes threat­en the very fab­ric of gov­er­nance and rule of law.

In the last few months alone, three Cari­com mem­ber states—Trinidad and To­ba­go, Guyana, and Ja­maica—have held gen­er­al elec­tions. These de­mo­c­ra­t­ic ex­er­cis­es sig­nal po­lit­i­cal ma­tu­ri­ty but al­so high­light the vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties in­her­ent in mo­ments of na­tion­al tran­si­tion. Elec­tions bring shifts in lead­er­ship, pol­i­cy, and some­times, un­cer­tain­ty. For small states in volatile en­vi­ron­ments, such shifts can cre­ate open­ings for or­gan­ised crime groups and hos­tile ac­tors to ex­ploit weak spots in gov­er­nance and en­force­ment.

The link­age be­tween po­lit­i­cal sta­bil­i­ty and re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty is di­rect. With­out a se­cure en­vi­ron­ment, po­lit­i­cal tran­si­tions risk be­ing un­der­mined by in­sta­bil­i­ty. Re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty, there­fore, can­not be viewed in iso­la­tion; it must be tied to the con­ti­nu­ity of democ­ra­cy, sov­er­eign­ty, and the con­fi­dence of our cit­i­zens.

Be­yond gov­er­nance, the im­pli­ca­tions for busi­ness con­ti­nu­ity, in­vest­ment, and tourism are pro­found. The Caribbean brand is built on sun, sea, and sta­bil­i­ty. There are sis­ter na­tions who have been for­tu­nate to be blessed with oil and gas, inch­ing their way to­wards the glob­al mar­ket and im­pact­ing a trade foot­print.

Tourists and in­vestors alike grav­i­tate to­ward safe, pre­dictable en­vi­ron­ments. A sin­gle in­ci­dent of vi­o­lent dis­rup­tion, a flare-up of or­gan­ised crime, or in­sta­bil­i­ty along our mar­itime bor­ders, has the po­ten­tial to tar­nish decades of na­tion-brand­ing ef­forts.

Tourism con­tributes up to 50 per cent of GDP in some Caribbean states, while for­eign di­rect in­vest­ment de­pends heav­i­ly on per­cep­tions of risk. Sus­tain­able de­vel­op­ment projects, whether in en­er­gy, tech­nol­o­gy, or in­fra­struc­ture, re­quire con­fi­dence in the sta­bil­i­ty of the host coun­try and re­gion. Sim­ply put: no in­vestor places long-term bets in volatile en­vi­ron­ments. Se­cu­ri­ty, there­fore, is not just about po­lice, sol­diers, and pa­trol boats; it is the back­bone of eco­nom­ic sta­bil­i­ty.

It is time for Cari­com to recog­nise re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty as a shared, col­lec­tive re­spon­si­bil­i­ty that can­not be frag­ment­ed by na­tion­al bor­ders. Crime, cy­ber threats, and traf­fick­ing net­works do not re­spect sov­er­eign­ty. If one mem­ber state fal­ters, the reper­cus­sions re­ver­ber­ate across the en­tire bloc.

The cre­ation of struc­tures such as the Re­gion­al Se­cu­ri­ty Sys­tem (RSS) in the East­ern Caribbean is a good mod­el, but it is now ev­i­dent that the ca­pac­i­ty is worth ex­pand­ing and strength­en­ing across the re­gion. In­tel­li­gence-shar­ing, joint op­er­a­tions, har­monised leg­is­la­tion, and in­ter­op­er­a­ble forces must be­come the norm rather than the ex­cep­tion.

Ad­di­tion­al­ly, part­ner­ships with ex­ter­nal al­lies, such as the US, EU, and the OAS, should be pur­sued strate­gi­cal­ly not as de­pen­den­cy, but as ca­pac­i­ty-build­ing mech­a­nisms.

What is ur­gent­ly need­ed is not just rhetoric but struc­tured in­vest­ment in re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty. This means:

• Pri­ori­ti­sa­tion: El­e­vat­ing se­cu­ri­ty dis­cus­sions to the top of the Cari­com agen­da, recog­nis­ing it as a pre­req­ui­site for eco­nom­ic growth.

• Re­sources: Fund­ing mod­ern tech­nol­o­gy, sur­veil­lance, train­ing, and co­or­di­nat­ed in­tel­li­gence-shar­ing mech­a­nisms.

• Struc­ture: Es­tab­lish­ing a per­ma­nent re­gion­al com­mand-and-con­trol frame­work ca­pa­ble of an­tic­i­pat­ing and neu­tral­is­ing threats.

• Strat­e­gy: De­sign­ing and im­ple­ment­ing a com­pre­hen­sive re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty strat­e­gy that in­te­grates cy­ber de­fence, bor­der se­cu­ri­ty, counter-nar­cotics, an­ti-gang op­er­a­tions, and re­silience against ex­ter­nal shocks. The Caribbean must move be­yond re­ac­tive mea­sures to proac­tive frame­works.

Se­cu­ri­ty must no longer be episod­ic, re­spond­ing on­ly when a cri­sis erupts, but sus­tained and em­bed­ded in our de­vel­op­ment ar­chi­tec­ture.

The Unit­ed Na­tions’ Sus­tain­able De­vel­op­ment Goals (SDGs) em­pha­sise peace, jus­tice, and strong in­sti­tu­tions as pre­req­ui­sites for de­vel­op­ment. For the Caribbean, this link­age is not the­o­ret­i­cal; it is lived re­al­i­ty. With­out se­cure bor­ders, safe com­mu­ni­ties, and re­silient in­sti­tu­tions, progress on ed­u­ca­tion, health­care, in­fra­struc­ture, and cli­mate re­silience will re­main frag­ile. More­over, re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty strength­ens our bar­gain­ing pow­er on the in­ter­na­tion­al stage. A unit­ed, se­cure Cari­com bloc can at­tract high­er lev­els of in­vest­ment, ne­go­ti­ate bet­ter trade deals, and present a stronger voice in mul­ti­lat­er­al fo­rums.

The time to raise the vol­ume on re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty is now. The de­ci­sive US ac­tions in Caribbean wa­ters, the elec­toral shifts across Cari­com states, and the con­tin­u­ing threats from nar­co-traf­fick­ing and transna­tion­al crime are clear in­di­ca­tors that the stakes are high­er than ever.

Re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty is not a lux­u­ry. It is not a mat­ter for to­mor­row. It is the foun­da­tion up­on which our sus­tain­able de­vel­op­ment, eco­nom­ic growth, and in­ter­na­tion­al rep­u­ta­tion rest. To ig­nore this re­al­i­ty is to jeop­ar­dise the very con­ti­nu­ity of Caribbean life as we know it.

The Caribbean has the tal­ent, the in­sti­tu­tions, and the part­ner­ships to se­cure it­self. What is need­ed now is the po­lit­i­cal will, struc­tured strat­e­gy, and col­lec­tive ur­gency to pri­ori­tise se­cu­ri­ty not as an af­ter­thought but as the bedrock of our fu­ture.

The call is clear: re­gion­al se­cu­ri­ty must be ex­er­cised with pri­or­i­ty, struc­ture, re­sources and strat­e­gy. On­ly then can the Caribbean tru­ly safe­guard its sta­bil­i­ty, pre­serve its brand, and chart a course of sus­tain­able busi­ness con­ti­nu­ity for gen­er­a­tions to come.