For­mal and le­gal arrange­ments gov­ern mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion be­tween Trinidad and To­ba­go and the USA. These in­clude the Sta­tus of Forces Agree­ment (SO­FA). The SO­FA was orig­i­nal­ly signed in 2007. Patrick Man­ning was the prime min­is­ter then. It was re­newed in 2013. Kam­la Per­sad-Bisses­sar was Prime Min­is­ter then. In late 2024 and ear­ly 2025, the SO­FA was amend­ed and ex­tend­ed. Dr Kei­th Row­ley was the Prime Min­is­ter then.

Five agree­ments were signed on De­cem­ber 10, 2024. SO­FA pro­vides the le­gal ba­sis for the tem­po­rary pres­ence of US mil­i­tary per­son­nel in T&T for mu­tu­al­ly agreed ac­tiv­i­ties. This in­cludes joint train­ing and ex­er­cis­es. Some of the agree­ments cov­er train­ing and sup­port of var­i­ous kinds for the T&T Coast Guard, in­clud­ing col­lab­o­ra­tion be­tween the USA and T&T on drug in­ter­dic­tion. Two of those agree­ments, the Caribbean Basin Se­cu­ri­ty Ini­tia­tive Tech­ni­cal As­sis­tance Field Team (CB­SI-TAFT) and the Ac­qui­si­tion and Cross Ser­vic­ing Agree­ment (AC­SA), deep­en strate­gic col­lab­o­ra­tion and seek to strength­en in­ter­op­er­abil­i­ty in de­fence and lo­gis­tics.

En­hanc­ing in­ter­op­er­abil­i­ty and in­creas­ing T&T’s de­fence ca­pa­bil­i­ties re­quire reg­u­lar and large-scale joint ac­tiv­i­ties. These have in­clud­ed ac­tiv­i­ties like Ex­er­cise Tradewinds with US South­ern Com­mand, joint train­ing for pre­ci­sion col­lab­o­ra­tion and build­ing mu­tu­al trust with the US Ma­rine Ex­pe­di­tionary Unit (USS Grave­ly), and even a float­ing hos­pi­tal (USNS Com­fort).

But be­yond mu­tu­al sup­port and good­will, these agree­ments for mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion be­tween the two coun­tries are fo­cused on in­hibit­ing drug car­tels and curb­ing nar­cotics and firearms traf­fick­ing. Both are per­sis­tent threats to T&T and the re­gion. Un­der these sev­er­al agree­ments for mil­i­tary col­lab­o­ra­tion and co­op­er­a­tion on mat­ters of se­cu­ri­ty, it is ex­pect­ed that the Prime Min­is­ter of T&T and the US Sec­re­tary of State would meet to dis­cuss na­tion­al se­cu­ri­ty is­sues, en­er­gy se­cu­ri­ty is­sues, and counter-nar­cotics co­op­er­a­tion from time to time. Our Prime Min­is­ter and the US Sec­re­tary of State did meet re­cent­ly in Wash­ing­ton, DC. Press­ing is­sues like tar­iff im­po­si­tion, the com­plex­i­ty of the chal­lenge of a Maduro-led Venezuela sev­en miles away, and restor­ing sta­bil­i­ty to a gang-con­trolled coun­try such as Haiti, a Cari­com part­ner, would have had to be part of dis­cus­sions.

Now, the stat­ed rea­son for the heavy US mil­i­tary pres­ence is dis­rupt­ing transna­tion­al crim­i­nal or­gan­i­sa­tions and elim­i­nat­ing drug trans­porta­tion on the high seas. In this sce­nario, Nicolás Maduro is be­ing tar­get­ed by the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion not for steal­ing an elec­tion nor for op­press­ing and ter­ror­is­ing his peo­ple, a third of whom have mi­grat­ed, but for be­ing head of an in­ner cir­cle con­trol­ling a “nar­co-ter­ror­ist state” run by the Car­tel de los Soles, which is deeply em­bed­ded in the high-rank­ing mil­i­tary.

As long as the USA frames its mil­i­tary ac­tion in the con­text of a war on drug car­tels, mas­sive mil­i­tary de­ploy­ment near Venezue­lan shores and con­duct­ing strikes on sus­pect­ed drug-run­ning boats can claim le­gal­i­ty with­in the bounds of in­ter­na­tion­al mar­itime in­ter­dic­tion ef­forts. The lack of due process and the sum­ma­ry ex­e­cu­tion of the ac­tors and pas­sen­gers of such boats may, at some point, be test­ed in court. But for now, the sus­pect­ed drug boats, 21 blown up with 83 dead, are be­ing iden­ti­fied as as­so­ci­at­ed with Tren de Aragua or Car­tel de los Soles, and with Maduro’s lead­er­ship. Tren de Aragua evolved out of prison gangs and con­sti­tutes an in­ter­na­tion­al drug and crime syn­di­cate. Soles and Aragua have link­ages.

The USA is cur­rent­ly main­tain­ing a high­ly vis­i­ble and adapt­able mil­i­tary pres­ence near Venezuela un­der the law­ful pre­text of counter-nar­cotics, and this mas­sive pow­er cre­ates the op­ti­mal con­di­tions for mil­i­tary and po­lit­i­cal co­er­cion. It is a stud­ied mil­i­tary strat­e­gy of “over­whelm­ing force” and “max­i­mum pres­sure” cal­cu­lat­ed to per­suade Maduro to ne­go­ti­ate and to sur­ren­der po­lit­i­cal pow­er.

So while a land at­tack on Venezuela is pos­si­ble, it will hap­pen on­ly if Maduro gives Pres­i­dent Trump no oth­er choice.

But Trinidad and To­ba­go is deeply at risk, what­ev­er hap­pens in Venezuela now. If Maduro stays, we will face dif­fi­cul­ty. Maduro goes, a smooth, sta­ble tran­si­tion can be guar­an­teed by no one. If a bat­tle for pow­er among po­lit­i­cal fac­tions of the Op­po­si­tion, gangs and gang­sters, the mil­i­tary, and mul­ti­var­i­ous forces en­sues, a high im­pact is cer­tain to be felt in T&T.

The US mil­i­tary pres­ence and joint ac­tion with lo­cal forces are there­fore an­tic­i­pa­to­ry and de­fen­sive, as T&T aligns strong­ly with the US and evolves in­to a US pro­tec­torate.

Who would have thought that the Caribbean would be­come one of the world’s mil­i­tary hot spots? That Venezuela would be­come the epi­cen­tre of ris­ing geopo­lit­i­cal ten­sion? And that Trinidad and To­ba­go would find it­self so at risk, as this re­gion gains at­ten­tion as the world’s ris­ing en­er­gy province, even as, with­out fan­fare, tar­iffs on T&T’s ma­jor ex­ports to the USA have been elim­i­nat­ed with the stroke of a pen.