In justifying the declaration of another State of Emergency (SoE) on March 3, 2026, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said T&T's National Security Council (NSC), which she chairs, noted that following the January 31 end of the previous SoE, there had been "an increase in violent criminal activity across the country, most of which has been carried out by members of organised criminal gangs."
"The NSC further noted that several of these acts of criminality have resulted in multiple deaths due to mass shootings and that the continuance of reprisal shootings amongst criminal gangs, if left unchecked, would endanger public safety."
Based on published police statistics, the Prime Minister's reference to "multiple deaths due to mass shootings," could only have been in reference to the period February 20 to 22, when five men were murdered, in three separate incidents, involving two double murders, in Diego Martin and Tunapuna.
From her statement, the Prime Minister seems to have concluded that these two incidents were "mass shootings," and that "the continuance of reprisal shootings amongst criminal gangs, if left unchecked, would endanger public safety."
The principal basis for the declaration of the SoE, therefore, seems to be that Government took pre-emptive action to prevent a bloodbath of reprisal killings that would have endangered public safety. The secondary basis was that "intelligence recently gathered indicates credible threats to attack police officers, prison officers and other members of the security and legal services."
However, in the absence of credible evidence, the question has to be asked and answered: Did Government need to declare an SoE to deal with "mass shootings" and gang reprisal killings?
It is useful to recall that when the current administration introduced its first SoE on July 18, 2025, the national security authorities escalated the use of roadblocks, increased police and army patrols in commercial and hotspot areas and, most importantly, issued an estimated 151 preventative detention orders for alleged gangsters and gang leaders. Some of the alleged gang leaders were sequestered at the military barracks in Chaguaramas, in an effort to ensure they could not communicate with their "soldiers" on the outside. However, at the end of the first SoE, none of the 117 detainees who were released have been charged.
In what is now the second week of the current SoE, there has been hardly any visible evidence of the use of the tactical measures that were deployed in the first SoE—and which, without a doubt, contributed to the 42 per cent decline in the number of murders last year. Simply put, this time around, the police do not appear to be displaying the same intensity of activity as they did during the first SoE.
This may well be a deliberate strategy of the authorities, who might be keeping their powder dry and may be using surveillance and other intelligence-led methodologies, at this time, as a prelude to more robust action later on.
While it may be argued that visible policing has a deterrent effect, the public should be willing to give the current (undisclosed) tactics of the national security hierarchy an opportunity to work. Although the first 10 days of an SoE—which may go on for as long as 180 days—is not enough time to form a judgement about its success or failure, it is notable that there have been fewer murders since the March 3 declaration than in the previous 10 days.
