“The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service has the situation under control... our strategic interventions are yielding the desired disruptive results.”
Those were the words of Police Commissioner Allister Guevarro in late 2025 at the tail end of a State of Emergency (SoE) that had gripped the nation for months.
Guevarro spoke of “precision-guided intervention” and “proactive disruption,” while assuring that the intelligence gathered would ensure the country’s safety well into the new year.
Mere days ago, the commissioner also boasted that technology and “innovation” had delivered a safe Carnival 2026, as we were told that “Operation Secure De VIBES” was a resounding success.
Additionally, Minister of Homeland Security Roger Alexander touted it as the safest Carnival festival in 20 years.
Yet, here we are again.
What changed so dramatically in such a short span of time?
Recent reports point to multiple killings, brazen shootings and intelligence suggesting threats to members of the protective services and the justice system.
Those developments cannot be ignored. The Government has a duty to act when credible threats emerge.
But acting is not the same as planning.
A State of Emergency is, by design, an exceptional measure which grants the Executive sweeping powers because circumstances are deemed extraordinary.
It was never meant to become a recurring feature of governance.
When a government invokes it repeatedly within such a short timeframe, we must ask whether we are confronting a national security crisis or compensating for systemic weaknesses in policing, prosecution and judicial throughput.
Nearly a year of emergency powers in 2025 afforded the State expanded authority to detain, search and disrupt criminal networks.
If, after that extended period, key figures could not be successfully prosecuted, then the problem lies deeper than in intelligence gathering.
The country needs clarity.
What is the long-term strategy? How will intelligence be converted into admissible evidence? How will cases move efficiently through the courts? How will communities be secured without repeatedly curtailing civil liberties? And crucially, how will the State prevent the cycle whereby detainees are released only to re-enter the criminal landscape amid unresolved cases?
There is also a matter of credibility.
When the public is told that the security forces had matters firmly in hand, only to see emergency powers reinstated weeks later, confidence erodes, and citizens begin to question not only the strategy but the narrative, since the “safest Carnival in 20 years” is being followed by an SoE just 20 days later.
None of this diminishes the very real threat posed by organised criminal elements. The violence is real. The fear is real. The need for decisive leadership is real.
But decisive leadership must also be strategic leadership, and normalising States of Emergency does not reflect positively on any of those.
The people of this nation deserve a plan that works when the lights are on and the sirens are off, not a revolving door of lockdowns that treat the symptoms while the disease of crime continues to fester.
