Over the past two decades, Trinidad and Tobago has experienced multiple states of emergency (SoEs), mainly triggered by increases in violent crime and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.
While the specific circumstances and exact measures varied, here is a brief look at how they compare.
1. State of Emergency (2011) – Mainly Focused on Crime:
The Trigger: A notable rise in violent crime, especially involving gangs and homicides.
The Measures: This SOE saw the implementation of a countrywide curfew as well as enhanced authority for law enforcement and military personnel, which included warrantless searches and swift arrests. Temporary detention facilities were established but although thousands were apprehended, many were subsequently released due to insufficient evidence.
The Impacts:
Short-term Decline in Violent Crime: Statistics revealed a considerable drop in trauma admissions (gunshot and stab wounds) at the national trauma centre during the State of Emergency.
Shift in Crime Dynamics: After the SoE was lifted, gunshot wounds remained relatively low, although there was an uptick in stab wounds, indicating a change in violent behaviour.
Human Rights Issues: Reports of police and military misconduct, including excessive force and unlawful detentions, raised alarms about human rights violations.
Burden on the Justice System: The large number of arrests overwhelmed the remand facilities.
Limited Long-Term Results: While the SoE was successful in the short term, it failed to eliminate the fundamental issues driving crime, and violent crime rates generally began to rise again once it was lifted.
2. State of Emergency (2021) – COVID-19 Related:
The Trigger: An intense third wave of COVID-19 cases and deaths.
Measures: Targeted public health, involving restrictions on movement, business closures, and limits on gatherings to control the virus’s spread. Although not directly focused on crime, these measures had indirect repercussions.
Impacts:
Public Health: Aimed at reducing COVID-19 transmission and relieving pressure on the healthcare system.
Economic Disruption: A significant detrimental effect on the economy, especially on the tourism industry, small and medium businesses, and informal workers. An increase in unemployment and poverty was expected.
Social Impacts: Disruption of critical social services, educational losses due to school closures, and a rise in domestic violence incidents due to enforced cohabitation and heightened stress.
Vulnerable Groups: Disproportionately impacted were vulnerable groups already facing economic struggles and social inequalities.
3. State of Emergency (December 2024/Early 2025) – Focused on Crime:
The Trigger: A renewed spike in violent crime, particularly gang-related murders involving high-calibre weapons, with 2024 establishing new homicide records.
Measures: Unlike prior SoEs, this one was explicitly declared to be free of curfews or restrictions on public assemblies. Instead, it aimed at providing police and military with enhanced constitutional powers specifically to target heavily armed criminals, execute searches and arrests without warrants, and confiscate illegal firearms.
Impacts (Recent Observations):
Targeted Focus: A more concentrated focus on gang violence and illegal firearms, seeking to avoid the extensive societal disruptions of earlier SoEs.
Potential for Short-term Decline: Early data indicated a drop in homicides compared to the previous year, suggesting some immediate influence on the crime rate.
Underlying Issues: Economists and social anthropologists emphasise that organised crime is connected to wider socioeconomic conditions and the country’s role as a transshipment point for illicit goods, indicating that SOEs alone are not sufficient long-term remedies.
4. State of Emergency (July 2025) – Crime-Related:
The Trigger: A specific threat believed to be coming from crime syndicates within the nation’s prisons.
Measures: Enhanced authority for law enforcement and military personnel. No curfew proposed in the initial announcement.