Dr Winford James
Max Albert and I continue our discussions on the Tobago Autonomy Question.
Last week, we ended with one of the great ironies of our political history. ANR Robinson won government in 1980 with 33 parliamentary seats and left office in 1991. In 1995, he returned with only two NAR representatives from Tobago. The UNC and PNM held 17 seats each.
Robinson no longer had 33. He had two. Yet those two would determine who governed Trinidad and Tobago.
And here the old criticism of Robinson encounters perhaps its greatest difficulty. If Robinson was indifferent to the deficiencies of Act 37 of 1980 when he possessed 33 seats, what did he do when history returned him to influence with only two?
He returned to Tobago’s unfinished business. The NAR entered an arrangement with the UNC, Basdeo Panday became Prime Minister, and Robinson returned to government as Minister Extraordinaire and Minister of Tobago Affairs.
Behind him lay Act 37, Samaroo’s distinction between decentralisation and devolution, the NAR’s examination of the constitutionality of the Tobago House of Assembly, and the work of the Hyatali Constitution Commission.
Then, in November 1996, Robinson himself introduced the Constitution (Amendment) Bill concerning Tobago. It sought to place the existence of the Tobago House of Assembly, its Executive Council, and its Fund within the Constitution. Alongside it was the Tobago House of Assembly Act, No. 40 of 1996. Neither gave Tobago everything for which generations had struggled; today’s continuing autonomy debate proves that. But the chronology makes the accusation of Robinson’s neglect exceedingly difficult to sustain.
His Government amended the THA legislation. Samaroo articulated devolution. The NAR confronted the constitutionality of the Assembly. Hyatali examined the constitutional problem. The attempted coup intervened. Robinson lost office. And when political circumstances returned him to influence, Tobago’s constitutional question returned with him.
That is not a chronology of neglect. It is a chronology of interrupted constitutional work. Robinson’s experience also teaches Tobago something fundamental: political friendship is not constitutional protection. Governments change. Prime Ministers change. Parliamentary majorities disappear.
Robinson knew that better than most. He had moved from 33 seats to two.
The challenge was converting temporary political opportunity into permanent institutional protection—what we have described as the search for impregnability. Did Act 40 achieve it? Clearly not. If it had, Tobago would hardly still be searching 30 years later.
And here history becomes almost uncanny. Professor Hamid Ghany, now engaged in Tobago’s autonomy discussions, is no newcomer to this constitutional journey. He has served on the Hyatali Constitution Commission from 1988 to 1990 and subsequently on the THA Technical Team in negotiations with Central Government from 1992 to 1995. He was there while the architecture was being examined.
Nor is Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar a stranger to this history. She entered politics during the NAR period and, as Minister of Legal Affairs in 1996, participated in the parliamentary debate on Robinson’s constitutional amendment concerning Tobago. As Prime Minister in 2012, she again asked Ghany to chair consultations concerning constitutional reform and internal self-government for Tobago.
Today, she is Prime Minister again. And Ghany is again engaged.
But there is now another actor standing at the centre of Tobago’s history. One Farley Augustine. His Tobago People’s Party holds Tobago’s two seats in the national Parliament. Before the 2025 election, Farley himself described those seats as potential bargaining instruments through which Tobago could pursue constitutional change.
Then came January 2026. His TPP won all 15 elected seats in the Tobago House of Assembly.
Few Tobago leaders have possessed a clearer local mandate. Farley has rejected previous autonomy proposals as insufficient. He has spoken of Tobago obtaining law-making authority, determining its governmental arrangements and exercising meaningful authority over matters affecting Tobago, including its maritime space.
The circumstances may therefore be deemed to be unusually favourable. A Prime Minister publicly supportive of Tobago’s self-government. A constitutional scholar carrying institutional memory from the Robinson era. Two Tobago representatives in Parliament. And a Chief Secretary possessing an overwhelming mandate at home.
But Robinson’s history supplies a warning. Friendship with a Prime Minister is not autonomy. A favourable Central Government is not autonomy. Two strategically important parliamentary seats are not autonomy. Even 15 Assembly seats are not autonomy.
They are political opportunities. The question is what Farley will accept in exchange for them. Robinson’s unfinished search was for an arrangement capable of surviving the politicians and parliamentary arithmetic that produced it.
Thirty years after Act 40, Tobago should accept no less. The personalities have changed. Some of the constitutional minds have not. The opportunity has returned.
Will Farley use his overwhelming mandate merely to obtain more powers, or to complete the search for an arrangement that cannot easily be taken away and broker a more perfect Union for Tobago and for the Republic?
That question belongs to our next discussion: Understanding Farley.
Dr Winford James is a retired UWI lecturer who has been analysing issues in education, language, development and politics in T&T and the wider Caribbean on radio and TV since the 1970s. He has also written thousands of columns for all major newspapers in the country.
