The last five columns focused on what has been loosely labelled “a foreign exchange crisis”. We noted that the forex shortage is primarily linked to a secular decline in the volume of natural gas production and international energy prices, which generate the bulk of forex earnings. This has resulted in a persistent forex shortfall despite the Central Bank’s (CBTT) monthly forex injections into the system. It also noted that numerous IMF Article IV Reports identified that the official exchange rate was overvalued when compared to the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER).
In effect, the official exchange rate is a fixed rate supported by CBTT monthly releases to the commercial banking system. Keeping the exchange rate fixed rather than allowing it to float with the movement in the terms of trade acts as an effective subsidy. Maintaining this system has consequences.
First, the economy loses competitiveness. Avoiding an exchange rate adjustment removes the incentive to find alternative or new exports, ie, diversification. Second, it leaves forex demand unaltered. Third, a supply shortage facilitates an unofficial market and hoarding. Fourth, it encourages the administration to rely on external loans to meet forex demand and defend the status quo rather than address the policy mismatches that exacerbate the crisis.
The continuous decline in the official exchange reserves, the import cover, and the constant private sector complaints provide concrete evidence that the current administrative mechanisms have failed. The commercial banking sector’s effort to restrict demand by unilaterally reducing credit card limits may act to decelerate the outflow but cannot override the fundamental flaws in the current operating system. What are the administration’s plans to address the persistent forex shortage?
Finance Minister Davendranath Tancoo acknowledged the public complaints about the availability of foreign exchange when presenting the 2025 Mid-Year Budget Review. He indicated that he would pursue several initiatives to address the complaints, if not the shortage. The seven initiatives are listed in the order in which they were presented.
First, to establish a Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, to bring “greater transparency, equity and strategy to the allocation of scarce FX resources”. Second, to implement reporting obligations for high-volume importers to ensure foreign exchange inflows and outflows were aligned with the country’s economic priorities. Third, the development of repatriation protocols, investment protection frameworks and dividend safeguards to boost investor confidence in Trinidad and Tobago’s economic institutions.
Fourth, to explore foreign currency tax exemptions and investment tax credits. Fifth, to review “… Trinidad and Tobago’s network of bilateral tax treaties and work with Caricom partners to advance regional tax harmonisation, promoting cross-border investment and reducing administrative burdens on regional businesses.” Minister Tancoo suggested two other possible initiatives. Sixth, to introduce an Export Allowance and Export Growth Incentive, with a focus on high-potential non-Caricom markets and expand international trade representation. Seventh, he said there are considerations to establish an Export Proceeds Retention Facility.
The forex shortage is both immediate and ongoing. It requires a mixture of immediate reforms and medium-term measures. The first three initiatives are administrative and do nothing to alleviate the situation. Initiatives four, five and six are fiscal measures which one could expect in the 2026 Budget. Fiscal measures take time to implement and even more time to take effect, provided they are adequately designed. Therefore, they can have no immediate impact on the current situation. Similarly, it is unclear what is meant by an “Export Proceeds Retention Facility”, as nationals have been allowed to operate foreign currency accounts since the late 80s.
Government’s response to the forex shortage is focused on the assumption that there is an imbalance in how forex is distributed. However, it has not addressed nor acknowledged that policy mismatches create the problem, such as running persistent deficits with a fixed exchange rate. Only net earners of forex have no difficulty in sourcing their forex needs, and even they will have periodic imbalances.
Presumably, the “Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee” will be a creature of the CBTT, as commercial banking regulation is the CBTT’s province, not the Cabinet’s. A lot remains to be resolved. Under what principles will the committee operate, and what will be its legal basis? How will its recommendations be implemented?
The CBTT has wide data collection powers, including the broad details of forex usage. Undoubtedly, the data collection can be improved. However, commercial bank customer data is protected by well-defined common law principles. The debate between Prof Rose-Marie Belle Antoine and Dr Terrence Farrell reveals differences in legal interpretation in the application of the Central Act relative to private data. Appointing a Central Bank governor who is likely to be more amenable to the administration’s directives is helpful.
The third initiative, the development of repatriation protocols, investment protection frameworks, and dividend safeguards, sounds more applicable to incoming foreign direct investment, although it could also apply to outgoing investment.
Demand exceeds forex supply. Minister Tancoo’s announced initiatives will not improve forex availability in the next three years. The unaddressed issue is that the official exchange rate is not supported by market fundamentals. If the forex pricing mechanism remains divorced from a market-based solution, or T&T export earnings remain depressed, or the fiscal deficit continues, the shortage will persist.
Mariano Browne is the Chief Executive Officer of the UWI Arthur Lok Jack Global School of Business
