Dr Winford James
Max Albert and I continue our discussions on the Tobago Autonomy question.
Few constitutional recommendations have shaped Tobago’s modern political discourse as profoundly as those of the Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC). For more than a quarter of a century, the proposal that Tobago should receive between 4.03 per cent and 6.9 per cent of the annual national budget has influenced constitutional debate, political negotiation, and public expectations. Yet one important question has quietly endured through successive administrations: how did the Commission arrive at those figures?
To ask that question is not to diminish the work of the Commission. Quite the opposite. The DRC deserves recognition for bringing greater order and constitutional certainty to a process that had too often depended upon political discretion. By proposing a measurable range rather than leaving Tobago’s allocation entirely to annual negotiation, the Commission made a significant contribution to the constitutional evolution of the Republic.
However, constitutional settlements derive their legitimacy not only from the fairness of their outcomes but also from the transparency of the reasoning that produces them. Citizens are entitled to understand not merely the destination, but the path by which constitutional decisions are reached.
This concern is not a modern invention. During Parliament’s debate on the DRC Report, Member of Parliament Pamela Nicholson accepted that the Commission had identified approximately 4.03 per cent as Tobago’s share of the national population and therefore as an appropriate starting point. Her concern, however, was directed elsewhere. By what measurable reasoning did the Commission move from that population-based figure to the recommended ceiling of 6.9 per cent? More than twenty-five years later, that remains a legitimate constitutional question.
Our examination of the Commission’s report and the parliamentary record suggests that the DRC explained its starting point but did not publish a methodology capable of independently reproducing the movement from 4.03 per cent to 6.9 per cent. But that observation should not be understood as an allegation that the Commission acted arbitrarily. Rather, it identifies an analytical gap that has become increasingly important as Tobago’s constitutional aspirations have matured.
Several issues emerge. First, there is a methodological gap. While the report identifies relevant considerations—including population, geography, administrative responsibilities, and developmental needs—it does not disclose how those variables were weighted or mathematically combined to produce the recommended range.
Second, there is a transparency gap. Constitutional formulas should be sufficiently clear that parliamentarians, researchers, and citizens alike can understand and, where appropriate, reproduce the analytical process. Transparency strengthens confidence; uncertainty invites continuing debate.
Third, there is an evidential gap. Although the Commission undoubtedly considered a wide range of information, the published report does not fully demonstrate the quantitative relationship between that evidence and the final percentages. As a result, discussion has often centred on defending the figures rather than understanding the reasoning behind them.
Fourth, there is an accountability gap. Every constitutional recommendation should be capable of public examination. Where the analytical pathway remains unclear, successive governments inevitably interpret the recommendation differently, thereby contributing to recurring disagreements over Tobago’s fiscal entitlement.
Finally, there is a review gap. The DRC formulated its recommendations within the economic realities of its day. Since then, national revenue, public expenditure, institutional responsibilities, and Tobago’s own development have changed considerably. A methodology that cannot easily be revisited or updated becomes increasingly difficult to apply in changing circumstances.
Can the Commission’s reasoning nevertheless be inferred? Perhaps.
One may reasonably conclude that the DRC began with Tobago’s population share and then adjusted that figure to reflect factors that population alone could never adequately capture. The fixed costs of governing an island, transportation and insularity, infrastructure requirements, developmental disparities, and the constitutional responsibilities of the Tobago House of Assembly may all have influenced the Commission’s thinking. Such considerations would represent entirely legitimate policy judgments.
The difficulty lies elsewhere.
The published report does not reveal how each of those considerations was measured, how much importance each received or how, collectively, they produced the recommendation of 6.9 per cent. Without that analytical bridge, independent verification becomes impossible. The Commission gave the nation a conclusion, but not a methodology capable of reproducing that conclusion.
This distinction matters because constitutional finance must command public confidence across generations. Future governments should not be expected simply to inherit percentages. They should also inherit the reasoning by which those percentages were established. Transparent methodology permits informed review, objective refinement, and greater public trust.
The discussion therefore extends beyond the DRC itself. It invites a broader national conversation about the principles that should govern Tobago’s fiscal relationship with Trinidad in the twenty-first century. As Tobago assumes greater constitutional responsibilities and as the Republic continues to evolve, there is increasing merit in developing a modern framework through which the contribution of every part of the nation can be objectively assessed. That broader discussion is one to which we shall return.
The DRC made an important contribution by moving Tobago beyond the uncertainty of arbitrary annual allocations. That achievement deserves acknowledgement and respect. Yet constitutional justice is strengthened when its arithmetic is as transparent as its principles. If future generations are to continue relying upon the Commission’s recommendations, they deserve more than percentages alone. They deserve the methodology, the reasoning, and the evidence by which those percentages were determined.
The reality, however, is that, after more than 25 years of trial and error, disputes and fractures still subsist between the two sides of the Republic. The validating elites have had their say, but Tobago’s economic reality demands a new model as well as a final solution and covenant towards an equal place in the Republic.
Dr Winford James is a retired UWI lecturer who has been analysing issues in education, language, development and politics in T&T and the wider Caribbean on radio and TV since the 1970s. He has also written thousands of columns for all major newspapers in the country.
