Dr Winford James
Max Albert and I continue our discussions on the Tobago autonomy question.
Our previous article concluded with what we believe to be a simple yet profound constitutional proposition: before preserving 4.03 per cent, let the Republic explain 100 per cent. We return to that proposition because, until the Republic satisfactorily accounts for the entirety of its national estate, every discussion concerning Tobago’s fiscal arrangements must necessarily remain incomplete.
The National Contribution Framework was never intended to be an academic exercise in economics. It was conceived as a constitutional framework through which the Republic might first determine the value of Tobago’s contribution before debating the equity of Tobago’s allocation. We argued that no prudent estate can fairly distribute its resources until it has first undertaken a comprehensive valuation of the estate itself.
Yet, every constitutional proposition gives birth to another. Thus, we ask, if Tobago’s contribution can be identified, measured, valued and relied upon by the Republic, by what constitutional principle should Tobago remain without meaningful fiscal instruments to preserve, improve and enlarge that very contribution?
That, in our respectful view, is the Republic’s Taxation Conundrum.
This is not an argument about taxation for taxation’s sake. Neither is it an invitation to constitutional separation or fiscal fragmentation. Rather, it is an invitation to consider whether the constitutional evolution of the Republic has kept pace with the constitutional responsibilities Tobago possesses. Contribution, stewardship and fiscal authority are inseparable companions.
Every successful estate requires not merely assets, but a steward equipped with the practical means to preserve, improve and enlarge those assets. To acknowledge Tobago’s contribution while withholding from its stewardship the fiscal instruments necessary to sustain and expand that contribution is to create a constitutional imbalance which no mature Republic should willingly perpetuate.
The proposition we advance today is neither unprecedented nor constitutionally adventurous. Across the Commonwealth and beyond, mature democracies have recognised that governments cannot effectively discharge increasing responsibilities while possessing only limited fiscal authority. Scotland, for example, exercises defined tax powers within the United Kingdom; Wales has progressively acquired fiscal authority through constitutional reform; and the Åland Islands of Finland enjoy financial arrangements reflecting their autonomous status. None of these jurisdictions abandoned national unity. Rather, each sought to strengthen it by better aligning responsibility with fiscal capacity.
Trinidad and Tobago, however, need not imitate any single constitutional model as our history, geography and political evolution are uniquely our own. Nevertheless, constitutional wisdom often lies not in imitation but in learning. Throughout the democratic world, one principle consistently emerges: responsibility and fiscal authority should, as far as prudence permits, travel together.
Tobago’s circumstances make that principle particularly compelling.
Geography imposes costs that legislation cannot repeal. Every shipment crossing the sea, every public project undertaken, every specialised service procured, every commercial enterprise supplied and every piece of public infrastructure maintained carries the unavoidable economics of insularity. These are not temporary inconveniences; they are permanent structural realities.
Consequently, equality cannot always be measured by identical allocations alone. A mature Republic should promote not merely equality of treatment, but equality of opportunity.
The constitutional objective is therefore to acquire neither privilege nor preference. It is to provide Tobago with sufficient fiscal instruments to mitigate the structural disadvantages of insularity, stimulate enterprise, encourage investment, improve public administration and ultimately enhance the quality of life of Tobagonians while strengthening the Republic itself. Fiscal instruments are therefore not ends in themselves; they are instruments of stewardship, and in this proposal, their purpose is not to separate Tobago from the Republic but to enable Tobago to contribute more effectively to it.
Act No. 40 of 1996 represented a significant milestone in Tobago’s constitutional development and restored the Tobago House of Assembly with substantial administrative responsibilities across numerous areas of governance. Yet while responsibilities expanded, the fiscal instruments available to discharge those responsibilities remained comparatively limited. Tobago received broader stewardship, but no commensurate measure of fiscal authority.
That constitutional reality deserves thoughtful national reflection. The question before the Republic is therefore not whether Tobago simply wishes to collect taxes; such a proposition would trivialise an issue of profound constitutional importance. The real task before the Republic is equipping Tobago with carefully designed fiscal instruments proportionate to its constitutional responsibilities and consistent with the unity of the State.
No prudent estate expects its steward to preserve valuable assets while withholding the tools necessary to perform that duty. Neither should a mature Republic. The National Contribution Framework has therefore exposed a larger constitutional question. If Tobago’s contribution is national, should the fiscal instruments necessary to preserve, improve and enlarge that contribution remain entirely external to Tobago’s own stewardship?
That is the Taxation Conundrum. It is neither a political slogan nor a constitutional novelty. It is the next logical question in the Republic’s constitutional evolution.
We therefore return to where we began. The Republic cannot continue to measure Tobago’s contribution in national terms while confining Tobago’s stewardship to limited fiscal instruments. That constitutional equation remains incomplete.
The whole 100% must first be known and understood before any part can be fairly determined.
Only when the Republic has measured the value of its entire estate, recognised the contribution of every part of the estate and equipped every steward with the fiscal instruments necessary to discharge their constitutional responsibilities can it truly claim to have fashioned a fiscal architecture worthy of a modern Republic.
Dr Winford James is a retired UWI lecturer who has been analysing issues in education, language, development and politics in T&T and the wider Caribbean on radio and TV since the 1970s. He has also written thousands of columns for all major newspapers in the country.
