Mick­ela Pan­day

When Trinidad and To­ba­go se­cured 181 votes in the Unit­ed Na­tions Gen­er­al As­sem­bly on June 3, 2026, to win a non-per­ma­nent seat on the Se­cu­ri­ty Coun­cil for 2027–2028, it was a mo­ment of na­tion­al achieve­ment and a vote of con­fi­dence in the con­tri­bu­tion our coun­try can make. But that achieve­ment brings re­spon­si­bil­i­ty. What mat­ters now is the voice we take with us.

That re­spon­si­bil­i­ty makes the Gov­ern­ment’s re­cent de­ci­sions at the Unit­ed Na­tions par­tic­u­lar­ly trou­bling. In the space of five days, Trinidad and To­ba­go took two po­si­tions that marked a sharp de­par­ture from our es­tab­lished vot­ing record. They raise se­ri­ous ques­tions about the di­rec­tion of our for­eign pol­i­cy as we pre­pare to serve on the body with pri­ma­ry re­spon­si­bil­i­ty for in­ter­na­tion­al peace and se­cu­ri­ty.

Con­sid­er the vote on Cu­ba. Af­ter ab­stain­ing in 1992, Trinidad and To­ba­go sup­port­ed the call for an end to the Unit­ed States em­bar­go at every sub­se­quent vote through 2025. Yet, on Oc­to­ber 28 this year, we joined the Unit­ed States and 15 oth­er coun­tries in vot­ing against the res­o­lu­tion. It was adopt­ed by 130 votes to 17, with 25 ab­sten­tions.

The Prime Min­is­ter de­fend­ed the re­ver­sal by in­vok­ing democ­ra­cy and po­lit­i­cal free­dom in Cu­ba. But that does not an­swer the ques­tion. The res­o­lu­tion did not ask us to en­dorse Cu­ba’s po­lit­i­cal sys­tem. It called for an end to an eco­nom­ic, com­mer­cial and fi­nan­cial em­bar­go im­posed by the Unit­ed States. We can con­demn re­stric­tions on po­lit­i­cal free­dom in Cu­ba while recog­nis­ing that an em­bar­go bur­dens or­di­nary peo­ple and af­fects coun­tries be­yond Cu­ba. Those po­si­tions are not mu­tu­al­ly ex­clu­sive.

The re­sponse from Wash­ing­ton made the vote even more strik­ing. In the days fol­low­ing the vote, US Deputy Sec­re­tary of State Christo­pher Lan­dau pub­licly thanked the Per­sad-Bisses­sar Gov­ern­ment for vot­ing with the Unit­ed States and the Prime Min­is­ter thanked him in re­turn. But the peo­ple of Trinidad and To­ba­go are en­ti­tled to ask why a po­si­tion main­tained for more than three decades was re­versed and what na­tion­al in­ter­est that re­ver­sal served.

And then came the vote on the In­ter­na­tion­al Crim­i­nal Court. On No­vem­ber 2, Trinidad and To­ba­go ab­stained on a Gen­er­al As­sem­bly res­o­lu­tion con­cern­ing the Court’s an­nu­al re­port. It was adopt­ed by 93 votes to 13, with 36 ab­sten­tions; the Unit­ed States vot­ed against. This was not a vote on our mem­ber­ship of the Court. It con­cerned the Court’s work and co­op­er­a­tion with the Unit­ed Na­tions, at a time when the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion had sanc­tioned ICC judges and pros­e­cu­tors and, on Oc­to­ber 9, the Court it­self.

Our ab­sten­tion was a po­lit­i­cal de­ci­sion, not a pro­ce­dur­al foot­note. What, specif­i­cal­ly, pre­vent­ed the Gov­ern­ment from sup­port­ing the res­o­lu­tion? What prin­ci­ple was it seek­ing to de­fend? If there were le­git­i­mate ob­jec­tions, the coun­try de­serves to hear them. The pub­lic can­not be ex­pect­ed to ac­cept such a change with­out ex­pla­na­tion.

Tak­en to­geth­er, the two votes raise ques­tions that can­not be dis­missed as po­lit­i­cal mis­chief. They do not prove that Wash­ing­ton in­struct­ed Port-of-Spain how to vote. But they in­vite scruti­ny, es­pe­cial­ly when the Prime Min­is­ter has made her con­tin­ued sup­port for Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump abun­dant­ly clear. Her po­lit­i­cal friend­ships are her own. Trinidad and To­ba­go’s for­eign pol­i­cy is not hers to per­son­alise.

This is not an ar­gu­ment against the Unit­ed States. Amer­i­ca is an im­por­tant part­ner and main­tain­ing a strong re­la­tion­ship with Wash­ing­ton is in our na­tion­al in­ter­est. But a strong part­ner­ship does not re­quire au­to­mat­ic agree­ment, any more than an in­de­pen­dent for­eign pol­i­cy re­quires con­fronta­tion. It re­quires sound judge­ment, the abil­i­ty to work with friends, dis­agree when nec­es­sary and make de­ci­sions on the mer­its of each is­sue.

That judge­ment mat­ters even more af­ter the re­cent Amer­i­can midterm elec­tions. De­moc­rats have won con­trol of both the House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives and the Sen­ate. Trump re­mains in of­fice, but from Jan­u­ary he will face an op­po­si­tion-con­trolled Con­gress with greater pow­er to scru­ti­nise his ad­min­is­tra­tion and con­strain his agen­da. The po­lit­i­cal land­scape in Wash­ing­ton has shift­ed. Will this Gov­ern­ment con­tin­ue to pro­mote the Trump agen­da with the same en­thu­si­asm or will it dis­tin­guish be­tween main­tain­ing a strong re­la­tion­ship with the Unit­ed States and align­ing our for­eign pol­i­cy with one pres­i­dent’s po­lit­i­cal agen­da?

Our Se­cu­ri­ty Coun­cil term be­gins in Jan­u­ary 2027. We will con­sid­er con­flicts, sanc­tions and threats to in­ter­na­tion­al peace and se­cu­ri­ty, in­clud­ing where pow­er­ful na­tions’ in­ter­ests col­lide. Our de­ci­sions will be judged not by the warmth of our re­la­tion­ships with world lead­ers, but by the prin­ci­ples, judge­ment and na­tion­al in­ter­ests that in­form them.

The 181 votes were a vote of con­fi­dence in Trinidad and To­ba­go, not a per­son­al en­dorse­ment of the Prime Min­is­ter or a blank cheque for this Gov­ern­ment’s for­eign pol­i­cy. We must ap­proach that re­spon­si­bil­i­ty with con­fi­dence and con­sis­ten­cy, re­mem­ber­ing that our first oblig­a­tion is to the peo­ple of Trinidad and To­ba­go.

We did not se­cure this seat sim­ply to be present. We se­cured it to con­tribute, to speak and to stand by prin­ci­ples that mat­ter. A seat at the ta­ble is an op­por­tu­ni­ty. What we say when we get there will de­ter­mine whether we make it count.

Mick­ela Pan­day is the Po­lit­i­cal Leader of the Pa­tri­ot­ic Front and At­tor­ney at Law