Last week Monday, minority shareholder advocate, Peter Permell, wrote to the company secretary of Prestige Holdings Ltd, taking issue with the failure and/or refusal of Agostini Ltd to comply with takeover bylaw 26 (2), which requires minority shareholders of a company being taken over to be given certain options if the acquiring company goes beyond 90 per cent.
Agostini officially launched its takeover bid for Prestige Holdings on June 17, 2025, offering shareholders of Prestige an all-equity share swap to acquire 100 per cent of the restaurant management company. Prestige shareholders were offered 1 Agostini (AGL) share for every 4.8 Prestige shares they owned.
The original, initial closing deadline for the offer was July 21, 2025, but the offer only closed on June 23, 2026 as a result of delays in regulatory approval, in particular, the length of time it took for the Government to appoint a board for the T&T Fair Trading Commission.
Permell, who is a shareholder of Prestige Holdings Ltd, took the decision to go public with the issue because to do otherwise could also serious financial consequences for other minority and dissenting shareholders of Prestige.
Re: Concerns regarding the Failure and/or Refusal of Agostini Holdings Limited as offeror to comply with bylaw 26 (2) of the Securities Industry (Take-Over) By-Laws, 2005 (the By-Laws) in connection with its offer and takeover bid made to Prestige Holdings Limited Shareholders on June 15, 2025
Further to our telephone conversation of Friday, 24th July 2026, I write to formally express my deep disappointment regarding the apparent nonchalant and laissez -faire oral response of Prestige Holdings Ltd (PHL) with respect to my serious concerns that on 24th July 2026, Agostini Holdings Ltd (AGL) allegedly failed to comply with or in other words breached By-Law 26 (2) of the Securities Industry (Take-Over) By-Laws, 2005 (the TakeOver By-Laws) in connection with its Offer and Take-Over Bid made on 17th June 17, 2025.
I wish to reiterate that this is particularly concerning in circumstances where AGL and PHL are both publicly listed companies and share a common chairman and majority shareholder.
As previously explained to you, it is my understanding that pursuant to By-Law 26. (1):
Where 90 per cent or more of a class of voting or equity securities of the offeree issuer are acquired by or on behalf of the offeror, the offeror’s affiliates and the offeror’s associates, then the holder of any securities of that class not counted for the purposes of calculating such percentage shall be entitled in accordance with this section to require the offeror to acquire the holder’s securities of that class. (My emphasis)
26 (2): Every offeror, within 30 days after it becomes aware that security holders are entitled to require it to acquire their securities under paragraph (1), shall send a written notice to each such security holder that the security holder may within 60 days after the date of such notice require the offeror to acquire his, her or its securities.
Additionally, for the avoidance of doubt, pursuant to these Take-Over By-Laws, the definition of Offeror and Take-Over Bid are as follows:
Offeror means a person who makes a take-over bid, an issuer bid or an offer to acquire and, for the purposes of by-law 19, includes a person who acquires a security, whether or not by way of a take-over bid, issuer bid or offer to acquire;
Takeover bid means an offer to acquire outstanding voting or equity securities of a class made to any security holder of the offeree issuer where the securities subject to the offer to acquire, together with the offeror’s securities, constitute in the aggregate 30 per cent or more of the outstanding securities of that class of securities at the date of the offer to acquire.
Needless to state, the preceding is self-explanatory and the incontrovertible evidence of the 90 per cent threshold being crossed by the AGL’s is the publication of its notice dated June 23 2026 which states inter alia: “At the close of the Bid Agostini received shares validly tendered pursuant to the Bid representing approximately 96.8% of the issued and outstanding shares of PHL.”
However, it is noteworthy that up to the date and time of this correspondence, AGL has failed and/or refused to comply with the legal requirements of the said By-Law 26 (2).
In the circumstances, I wish to immediately draw your attention to Section 99 of the Companies Act, Chap. 81:01 which states inter alia as follows:
99 (1) Every director and officer of a company shall in exercising his powers and discharging his duties-
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.
Accordingly, the directors of PHL each owe duties of honesty, good faith, care and diligence to the company. These duties include fair and equitable treatment of all its shareholders, including its minority and dissenting shareholders. In other words, each director of PHL has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that all necessary steps are taken to not only protect their investment interests but so too their legal rights.
In this regard, I wish to respectfully request that PHL provide the following:
1. An official statement indicating the company’s position concerning the alleged failure and/or refusal of AGL to comply with By-Law 26(2) of the Securities Industry (TakeOver) By-Laws, 2005;
2. An explanation of how PHL arrived at this position concerning the alleged breach;
3. A detailed explanation as to the rights, recourse and remedies available to the dissenting shareholders regarding the alleged breach;
4. Copies of any legal opinions, board resolutions, correspondence or communications considered by the PHL Board of Directors in determining the company’s position at
Item 1. above.
5. Confirmation of the steps and/or actions, if any, taken or to be taken by PHL to protect the interests of dissenting shareholders.
6. Confirmation of whether the allege breach is in the process of being reported to, has been reported to, or discussed with, the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange
Commission or any other relevant regulatory authority.
Going forward, I trust that the PHL will treat this matter with the seriousness and urgency it warrants as I look forward to a formal response within the next seventy-two (72) hours.
Please also note this letter is submitted without prejudice to any rights or remedies available to me as a dissenting shareholder under the Securities Act, the Securities Industry (TakeOver) By-Laws, 2005, the Companies Act, or common law, and nothing contained herein should be construed as a waiver of any such rights.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of this correspondence by return email.
Yours truly,
Peter Permell
Shareholder of Prestige Holdings Ltd
The letter was copied to Kester Guy, the CEO of the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission
