It is abundantly clear that the National Gas Company of T&T (NGC), over its 51 years of existence, has done a very good job in maximising the value of the country’s natural gas resources for the citizens of the country. Both major political parties that have governed since independence are fully aligned on the value-adding role of the NGC. However, as expected, each party would claim that they have done a better job under their stewardship in maximising the value.
Throughout its history, NGC has added value by fulfilling different roles. Its initial purpose, when founded in 1975, was to purchase, compress, transport, and sell natural gas to commercial and industrial users. That transitioned in the 1990s to be the “prime mover in gas-based development” which included a pivotal role in the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains and attracting international investors to establish world-scale ammonia, methanol, and urea plants. That further expanded in the 2000s to include backward and forward integration to hold equity in upstream oil and gas production and methanol and LNG marketing/trading.
In each of these phases, NGC was able to add significant value. Recognising the challenges ahead with sustainability in a world that needs to wean itself off hydrocarbon fuels over time, NGC proactively incorporated a sustainability focus into its purpose and embraced the green transition.
Additionally, and importantly, NGC has historically added value as a capacity builder and corporate citizen through education and training and social development.
It is very important to understand that profit is but one source of value. Value has a time dimension and usually refers to value to shareholders/stakeholders. When companies state that their purpose is to maximise shareholder value, they mean value in the medium/long term.
Businesses that maximise profits in one year by extracting as much value from customers as they can, are at the risk of losing those customers. Realising little value in profits beyond that year isn’t maximising shareholder value.
There is no paucity of current media commentary on the current state of the natural gas industry in T&T and additionally there is an ever-increasing commentary on the appropriateness of T&T’s strategy to meet the challenges that are currently being faced.
An emerging view seems to be that there is an apparent NGC focus on maximising short-term profits. This may or may not be correct and, if correct, it may or may not be a good strategy.
While NGC was progressing through its many phases from inception, concurrent changes were taking place in T&T’s natural gas resources, which, as expected, were moving from a state of abundance to a natural decline given the finite nature of these resources.
Not only was there a natural decline with some steep dips in natural gas production, but additionally what was replacing that was being depleted and was getting more expensive because of a combination of inflationary pressures, great complexity and subsurface challenges and diseconomies of scale.
This reality drove the significant reduction in the term of the upstream-to-NGC supply agreements and consequently the NGC to downstream-company supply agreements.
In 2017, the term of those agreements was for five years, followed in 2022/2023 by a term of three years and I believe the agreement between NGC and downstream companies in 2025/2026 is currently for 1 year... or a little more than six months, in one case.
Externally, the markets for the commodities (ammonia, DRI, LNG) produced in T&T were also transforming. The USA, with its shale gas revolution, was transforming from an importer to an exporter of products produced in T&T and Europe was effecting changes to address the drive toward a lower carbon future through their carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). All resulting in a significant challenge for the downstream producers in T&T.
Meanwhile, as expected, international downstream producers in T&T recognised this trend and mitigated the risk of relying solely on T&T production. They developed and expanded production in other locations, particularly where natural gas was abundant and competitively priced, infrastructure and personnel resources were readily available and established channels led to good markets.
Quoting from a piece by Rob Norton on unintended consequences– “The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions of people, and especially of governments, always have effects that are unanticipated or unintended. Economists and other social scientists have heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and popular opinion have largely ignored it.”
Is what we are currently witnessing with the shutdown of the Nutrien facilities, the delays in negotiation of downstream contracts, the negotiation of higher natural gas prices and the short tenure of the agreements in aggregate the “canary in the coal mine” warning of more dire downstream unanticipated consequences on the immediate horizon?
Or is this a short-term challenge which will be addressed when the Manatee, Manakin and Venezuelan gas (Dragon, Loran and Cocuina) becomes available starting with Manatee in late 2027 followed in 2028 and 2029 with the other gas supplies?
Would renewed contracts in 2027 be for a longer term and possibly better pricing terms?
In late 2023, the media published an article stating that NGC signed an amended supply agreement for gas from Manatee production for its downstream customers for the medium term - https://media.ngc.co.tt/media-release-ngc-and-shell-sign-amended-gas-sales-contract-to-include-manatee-gas.
NGC was signatory to a supply agreement for Venezuelan Dragon gas. Recently NGC in May 2026 entered a gas supply agreement with EOG for a two-year period for its downstream customers, including power generation and for LNG.
NGC should therefore have a much better understanding of what is likely to occur when downstream natural gas contracts come up again for renewal in 2027.
The closure of downstream facilities at Point Lisas will have a devastating impact on the economy of T&T, particularly on the direct employment which it provides for close to 4,000 people. The LNG facilities employ roughly 1/8 of this number. Further, there is the multiplier effect with services etc. which can be multiples of X 3 to X 4.
The impact on the adjacent communities in the areas that benefit from the multiplier effect will be equally devastating; areas like Couva/California and possibly as far as Chaguanas. The stakes are high and there should be no effort spared to understand the consequences of any strategy that is developed and implemented.
The NGC board, the Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries and, more broadly, the government have a very challenging situation to manage. They have the mandate of the people to govern and with that mandate, we expect them to formulate and implement a robust strategy based on relevant data and sound analysis conducted by industry experts. In such a high stakes game no less is expected.
The pressure on the Minister of Energy must be immense to assure that the NGC strategy is indeed robust. The time spent in engaging industry experts, reviewing data and analysis and the long hours devoted to discussing and debating the NGC strategy must be exhausting for the minister and his team and the NGC Board and its executive management.
The country understands and appreciates the personal sacrifices required by the long workdays, including work on weekends and the cognitively draining efforts to leave no stone unturned to avoid any unanticipated and unintended consequences that could be devastating for T&T.
